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Abstract 
 
In 2006, the Massachusetts legislature passed the landmark health care reform bill, “An 
Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,” with the hopes of 
reforming the state health care industry. The main targets of this reform were to contain hospital 
costs, to increase insurance rate and to improve quality of medical services. It is essential that we 
research this reform and determine whether or not it was successful, as it serves as a model and 
experiment for the national health care reform.  
Therefore, the primary focus of this paper is to explore the overall impact of the 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform on hospital operational costs and quality of medical services. 
Cost and quality data were collected from Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services and 
Hospital Compare websites. Three econometric models of cost, salaries and quality were 
developed to examine the overall impacts of the reform on the hospital cost and quality of 
medical services. Treatment measures of different diseases were used for quality dependent 
variables. Hospital department salaries and total operational costs were used for the salaries and 
cost dependent variables, respectively. Difference-in-differences technique was applied in the 
models to ensure that the result was due to the reform rather than national trend. 
Finally, regression results were analyzed to examine whether the aforementioned targets 
were met after four years of reform. Consistent with our predictions, we found evidence that the 
reform had positive effects on the quality of Massachusetts hospital services. We also found 
evidence consistent with the premise that Massachusetts hospital costs were contained. 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
The Massachusetts health care insurance reform refers to the legislation passed by the 
General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and signed into law by Governor Mitt 
Romney on April 12, 2006. This legislation is of great importance, as it not only increases the 
percentage of insured residents, but it also changed the health care insurance industry of 
Massachusetts in a number of ways. For example, such legislation expanded subsidized 
insurance and created a much more consumer-friendly health insurance market. In addition, the 
results of this reform over the past four years have been mentioned and discussed in the design of 
the national health care reform bill. There has been much research conducted on the impacts of 
the reform, but little research has focused on its effects on both hospital cost structure and the 
quality of medical care.  
As demonstrated by Jha, A.K. et. al, there is an inevitable relationship between cost and 
quality (Jha A. K., Orav, Dobson, Book, & Epstein, 2009). The motivation of the reform was to 
contain hospital costs and improve the quality of health services. However, changing one factor 
will also affect the other. There are many possible effects that the reform could have on the 
relationship between cost and quality. For example, if the reform were to decrease the revenue 
provided to the hospital, quality of health services could potentially decrease in effort to decrease 
hospital costs. Alternatively, if there is a decrease in revenue, perhaps hospitals will be 
encouraged to invest in improving health care quality to reduce costs of continued services due 
to previous incompetent or inefficient care. However, if the reform were to increase hospital 
revenue due to the increased insured rate, perhaps the hospital can afford to increase the quality 
of medical services. Although these patterns make sense logically, there are examples of low-
cost hospitals that provide a better quality of healthcare than costly hospitals, as well as examples 
of costly hospitals providing low-quality healthcare (Blumenauer, 2010). Thus, there is clearly a 
correlation between the two factors, but how they affect each other remains unclear, just as it is 
not clear how the reform will affect cost and quality (Jha A. K., Orav, Dobson, Book, & Epstein, 
2009). 
It is expected that the reform will affect both hospital operational costs and the quality of 
medical services, as there were specific aspects of this legislature that aimed at cost containment 
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and quality improvement. For example, the Health Care Cost and Quality Council, which will be 
discussed in more detail later, attempted to make the Massachusetts health care system more 
efficient by trying to reduce the number of hospital visits for patients with preventable health 
issues and trying to reduce the rate of nosocomial infection. By reducing these factors, the 
quality of medical services would increase and hospital costs would be contained, as unnecessary 
visits are reduced. However, it is also possible that the reform did not succeed in creating a more 
efficient health care system. Because insurance coverage increased due to the reform, there was a 
significant increase in the number of patients. Therefore, it is possible that hospital costs raised 
after the reform due to an increase in demand. As aforementioned, it is possible that an increase 
in costs could result in a decrease in the quality of medical services for affordability purposes.  
Currently, both quality and cost are very important for hospitals‟ daily operations. Without 
paying attention to quality, hospitals could not compete against others. Without focusing on cost, 
hospitals could not survive the current economic recession. Hence, how to constantly improve 
quality and contain costs is becoming a major topic for hospital top managers (Eldenburg & 
Krishnan, 2010). 
Because it is not clear how the reform affected hospital costs and health care quality, our 
research will explore this issue further in order to determine the outcome of such important 
legislature. This report will first provide the background information of the Massachusetts health 
care reform, formally known as “An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable 
Health Care,” which is Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006. This section will be followed by the 
literature review section, which will explore the research that has been previously conducted on  
this topic, and give further details on the specific research question of this project, which will be 
followed by a methodology section explaining the processes of our research. Lastly, we will be 
presenting the results of our research and analysis along with our conclusions.  
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2.0 Background Information 
 
The main goal of the Massachusetts health care reform  was to provide a universal 
coverage plan for the residents of Massachusetts. This was achieved by mandating all the 
residents to have health insurance, increasing employers‟ contributions to their employees‟ 
health coverage, and creating a more consumer-friendly health insurance market. Since 
Massachusetts is the first and the only state in the United States to require health insurance 
coverage for all of its residents, its implementation of such legislation is of interest to 
policymakers, employers, and individuals across the nation. The next section will provide 
national background in terms of health care cost and quality, which was a motivation for the 
Massachusetts health care reform. 
 
2.1 National Background 
 
The United States of America is one of the leading nations in the world and spends more 
money per capita on health care than any other nation (Roehr, 2008).  
 
Figure 1 Health Care Spending Per Capita in 2004 
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As can be seen from Figure 1 above, the cost of health care spending per capita was 
almost double for the United States than other developed countries. However, the country‟s 
health care services lacked in quality, as the U.S ranked one of the lowest in terms of life 
expectancy and infant mortality amongst developed countries (MacDorman & Mathews, 2008), 
as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 National Infant Mortality Rates in 2004 (MacDorman & Mathews, 2008) 
 
As is demonstrated by Figure 2 above, the infant mortality rate in the United States was 
the highest among the developed countries by a significant amount. Once again, it was almost 
double that of most of the other developed countries. In addition, the U.S. is the only 
industrialized country that does not guarantee universal health care coverage (Waldman, 2010). 
Access to health care has been a major social, political and economic issue in the U.S. for almost 
a century. At least 45 million American people, about 15% of the nation‟s total population, are 
completely uninsured, as of 2010 (Waldman, 2010). These citizens, therefore, are unable to seek 
the primary care needed in order to take preventative measures. As a result, most uninsured 
residents use the emergency room, driving up cost and usage, which burdens the state budget, as 
the fund comes out of the Safety Net and, therefore, the taxpayers. For example, the cost of an 
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emergency room visit is anywhere from $373-$1030 compared to the maximum cost of a visit to 
the primary care physicians of $168 or $220 for a new patient (Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, 
2010). There is also data to demonstrate that emergency room visits were increasing between the 
years 2004 and 2006 (Bigby, 2010).  
Today, health care still remains one of the most complex issues in the U.S. The nation is 
still trying to implement a universal coverage plan, but many obstacles stand in its way. While 
the nation experienced a lot of pressure surrounding this reform, the state of Massachusetts has 
received a lot of support from its residents since then (Long & Stockley, 2009).   
 
2.2 Why Massachusetts? 
 
In 2006, the state of Massachusetts enacted new health care reform legislation in order to 
attempt to address the pivotal health care issue. In contrast with other states in the nation, 
Massachusetts is a small and wealthy state which has a long history of being generous in giving 
coverage to its residents. There were numerous reasons why this reform was able to take place in 
Massachusetts. Amongst those reasons are the idea of pressure from the federal and state 
government, shared responsibility, the pre-existing regulations of the health care system, and its 
unique health care industry.  
Federal pressure is an important factor to explain why the reform took place in 
Massachusetts in 2006. Massachusetts received its federal funding through the authorized 1115 
Demonstration Waiver, which allowed the state government to fund its own Medicaid program 
and Uncompensated Care Pool. In 2005, when the state planned to renew its Waiver, the federal 
government required that the state needed to change its health care system in order to 
successfully renew the Waiver (Waldman, 2010). This type of pressure from the federal 
government provided a perfect background for the reform to begin fermenting.  The federal 
support also helped the state to fund its health care reform. Therefore, both the federal pressure 
and funding through the Section 1115 waiver played key roles in the initial design and the 
ongoing operation of the Massachusetts reform initiative (Long & Stockley, 2009). 
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 A crucial component of the health care coverage expansion in the health reform law is 
the concept of shared responsibility. There are many who believed that one of the most important 
reasons contributing to the passing of the legislation was the consensus between employer and 
the state government, which did not exist in previous attempts to reform the health care system 
(Seifert et. al, 2009). In 2006, Massachusetts already had the ninth highest rate of Employer-
Sponsored Insurance (ESI), which covered 68% of working people under the age of 65 years. 
This is a relatively high rate compared to other states in the nation (See Table 1). Because the 
majority of residents were already insured, employers did not need to cover as much of the 
population as other states. Therefore, it was less expensive for Massachusetts to make such a 
movement than other states. All of these factors described above make it more reasonable for the 
government to gain support of this reform from employers. 
 
Table 1 Health Insurance Coverage in  2006  (Steinbrook, 2006) 
 Massachusetts United States 
Population in Millions 6.4 293.7 
Employer Sponsored 59.5% 53.7% 
Medicaid 12.7% 12.8% 
Medicare 11.6% 11.8% 
Individual 4.3% 4.8% 
Other Public 0.7% 1.1% 
Uninsured 11.2% 15.9% 
 
 As one can see from the table above, the number of residents insured through Medicaid, 
Medicare, Individual and Other public insurers are practically the same in Massachusetts and in 
the nation. The only significant difference between the two charts is the employer sponsored 
insurance. In the case of Massachusetts, there is 59.5% of health insurance that is gained by 
employer-based coverage in contrast to only 53.7% in the nation. Consequently, Massachusetts 
is the optimal place to start a reform experiment with its low uninsured rate and relatively high 
ESI rate. However, the Massachusetts Health Care Reform Law of 2006 was not the state‟s only 
attempt at making changes to the health care system. 
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In 1985, the state government had established a “Free Care Pool,” which allowed free 
emergency care to patients who could not afford it. In late 2007, Massachusetts launched a 
program called the “Safety Net” to replace the Free Care Pool, which is for uninsured residents, 
in order to reach a goal of universal coverage. The “Safety Net” is different from the Free Care 
Pool in that it is less subsidized insurance for low-income residents, and those residents are 
responsible for higher fees. After some argument, the compromise had been made and the reform 
law finally was passed with a relatively small employer fine of $295 per uncovered employee per 
year, which made it even easier to increase the number of insured residents.  
Massachusetts also already had some relatively strict regulations on the health care 
insurance market. In Connecticut and Wisconsin, insurance companies have the right to refuse to 
cover individuals and to increase their premium based on their health history in other states, 
which is not the case in Massachusetts. (Seifert & Swoboda, 2009). Secondly, the health care 
insurance market of Massachusetts is mainly controlled by community-focused, non-profit 
insurance plan providers. Due to these two factors, the Massachusetts health care industry is 
slightly more consumer-friendly than in other states, making it a more convenient state to initiate 
reform. The next section will provide a timeline of the reform process.  
 
2.3 Timeline of the Reform 
 
In 2005, politicians and reformists thought that it was time for a second attempt at health 
care reform. They began advocating for the expansion of coverage. In April 2005 (Health Care 
For All, 2005), Massachusetts Senate President Robert Travaglini and the State Governor Mitt 
Romney formed a reform coalition to promote health reform plans (Geenberger, 2005). In June 
2005, Romney presented the reform ideas and announced the individual mandate plan in 
Massachusetts healthcare reform (Health Care For All, 2005). One month later, he introduced the 
health reform proposal to the Massachusetts legislature. In August 2005, a new policy actor, 
Affordable Care Today Association, filed a ballot initiative to place their proposal of healthcare 
reform in the legislation by November 2006 (Health Care For All, 2005). Table 2 below contains 
important dates and steps of the reform legislation.   
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Table 2 Timeline of the Massachusetts Health Care Reform (Health Connector, 2009) 
APRIL 12, 2006 Health Reform becomes law. 
OCTOBER 1, 2006 
Commonwealth Care expands to those with 
incomes below 100% of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL). 
JANUARY 1, 2007 
Commonwealth Care expands to those with 
incomes of up to 300% of the FPL. 
MAY 1, 2007 The Commonwealth Choice becomes available. 
JULY 1, 2007 
All employers in Massachusetts are required to 
offer sufficient plan, according to Health 
Connector or they will be responsible for 
employees‟ emergency medical care costs. 
OCTOBER 1, 2007 
Employers with 11 or more full-time-equivalent 
Massachusetts employees must contribute 
toward an employee health plan or suffer 
penalty of up to $295 per employee, per year. 
DECEMBER 31, 2007 
Individual mandate for health insurance is 
enforced or lose personal income tax deduction 
on 2007 state taxes. 
JANUARY 1, 2008 
Penalties will now equal half the premium of 
the lowest-cost Health Connector-certified 
insurance plan. 
JANUARY 1, 2009 
Benefits an adult must carry to avoid penalties 
now include prescription drug coverage, 
preventative and primary care, and no annual 
limit on treatment for any sickness. 
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2.4 Properties of the Reform 
 
In order for Massachusetts to motivate the start of this universal health plan, the reform 
legislation included some essential properties, such as: the creation of the Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector, Commonwealth Choice and Commonwealth Care, the increased eligibility 
for Medicaid, the organization of the Health Care Quality and Cost Council, the mandate for 
individual health insurance, and laws involving employers‟ responsibilities. The next few 
paragraphs will explain the purpose of the properties most significant to our research as well as 
evaluate them, and explore them in greater detail. 
Arguably, the most important part of the reform is the government‟s new role in the 
health care industry through their creation of the organizations which allowed the health care 
industry to be more consumer-friendly. For example, the government created the Health Care 
Quality and Cost Council, which requires that any cost and patient data of hospitals and 
physicians are made public (Waldman, 2009). Its purpose is to improve the quality of health care 
and to control cost inflation. The Council measures the health care quality and cost in 
Massachusetts by publishing annual reports. These reports provide information and different 
types of measurements related to quality and cost for each hospital. The Council is also 
responsible for setting quality and cost targets for the Massachusetts Health Care Reform. In the 
“Roadmap to Cost Containment” issued by this Council, several key strategies were mentioned 
to allow Massachusetts state government to control its health care cost inflation and to improve 
the quality of health care. The Roadmap also suggested that Massachusetts should enact policies 
that will have maximum impact on cost and quality. All of these measures were taken by the 
government in order to motivate the movement towards a universal health plan.   
Along with the reform legislation of 2006, came the mandate for all residents to have 
health insurance. The mandate requires every citizen of Massachusetts that is of legal age to 
obtain some form of health insurance if they are not covered by a government subsidized plan or 
their employer (Tanner, 2006). Those under the age of eighteen years old are required to be 
covered by their parents‟ plan (Steinbrook, 2006). This law was put into effect in July 2007 when 
individuals who did not abide were not able to receive personal exemption from the state income 
tax (about $219) (Tanner, 2006). Those who did not purchase insurance due to religious reasons 
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were exempt from these penalties (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2010), as well as anyone who earned 
less than 150% of the federal poverty level or who was only without insurance for a period of 
less than three months (Waldman, 2009). A health care safety net fund (provided by taxpayers) 
still remained in order to cover those who could not afford insurance or were ineligible for 
subsidized insurance, such as illegal aliens (Fisher, 2008). In 2007, only 5% of taxpayers were 
uninsured, of which 40% were exempt from paying any penalty (Waldman,  2009). In 2008, 
there was a 12% reduction from those who were penalized in 2007 (Waldman, 2009). Although 
this mandate played an important role in the health reform movement, it still remains a 
controversial subject to some.  Some believe that it could possibly eliminate the discrimination 
that occurs against some patients due to their health risks and needs by private insurance 
companies (Blumberg & Holahan, 2009). On the opposing side, some believe that for the 
government to require individuals to have health insurance is too invasive and may set the 
precedent for the government to play a role in personal health decision issues (Tanner 2006). For 
more information on some of the properties of the reform, see Appendix A. We will now move 
on to the next section which will discuss the short-term effects of the reform. 
 
2.5 The Short-term Results of the Reform 
 
The reform certainly did accomplish an increase in coverage among state residents. In the 
years leading up to the reform (2004-2006), about 88% had some form of health insurance, 
which increased by about 5.5% to 93.8% of all residents that were insured in the years after the 
reform (2008-2009) (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2010). In the few years after the reform, 352,170 
more residents were insured (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2010). Figure 3 below depicts the pie chart 
of coverage among Massachusetts residents.   
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Figure 3 Pie chart of Coverage Amongst Massachusetts Newly Insured Residents in 
2007 (Steinbrook, 2008) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3 above, about half of the newly insured population (50.2%) 
is covered under Commonwealth Care, which was created as a part of the reform, most of whom 
(about 80%) do not pay premiums. About 18.2% of the newly insured residents are covered 
under Medicaid, which is government subsidized. Almost a third, 31.3%, of the newly insured 
population has private insurance, over a fifth of whom have obtained that insurance through 
Commonwealth Choice, also a new program created by the reform. The reform significantly 
increased the number of insured residents as is exemplified by these statistics. As can be seen 
from the results presented above, the reform seems to have a positive impact on the health care 
system, but more research is needed in order to assess whether or not it was successful in 
accomplishing all of its goals. In the following section, we will explore examples of international 
reform in order to learn about the possible impacts that this reform can have. 
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2.6 An Example of International Reform 
 
Before their reforms, other countries also faced the issue of providing health care of 
sufficient quality that was both affordable for hospitals and patients (Chiang, 1997). If we 
examine the health care reforms in different countries, we can find an increasing competitive 
trend amongst private hospitals around the world. The advantages of these reforms are a renewed 
focus on the quality of care. The health care reform that took place in Taiwan will be discussed 
in this section, chosen for its similar economic conditions to the United States. 
After two decades of economic growth from the 1960s to the 1980s, Taiwan began its 
health care reform in 1987. Initially, the government studied more the health care systems of 
more than ten countries before combining all of their advantages to form their own system. In 
1995, Taiwan founded a model called National Health Insurance (NHI), which is mostly 
modeled after U.S. Medicare. There are many similarities between these two systems. However, 
there is one major difference between these two models: the entire population is eligible for NHI, 
while only the elderly are eligible for Medicare. Thus, NHI achieved universal coverage through 
a governmentally controlled insurance provider. Employees are responsible for lower rates than 
their employers. Generally, residents are responsible for a rate that remains stable, while low-
income individuals and veterans are fully subsidized. According to the Taiwanese model, every 
person is free to select the hospital and physician of their choice without being concerned about a 
waiting list. The package NHI offered covers preventative medical services, prescription drugs, 
dental services, Chinese medicine and home nurse visits. The previously uninsured increased 
their usage of medical services, since most preventative services, like annual checkups, are free 
of charge and other regular services are offered at an affordable price (Lu and Hsiao, 2003). By 
the end of 2001, 97% of the population was covered by this program. At that time, 70% of 
patients were satisfied with equal access to health care, financial risk protection and equal quality 
of the care provided (Chiang, 1997).  
While the quality of health care greatly improved, health care costs only increased 
slightly. Taiwanese spending on health care increased from 4.7% to 5.4% after NHI was enacted 
(Chiang, 1997). However, the cost of health care per capita is still less than 900 U.S. dollars 
(Chiang, 1997). The successes of the Taiwanese health care reform, such as the foundation of 
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NHI, the legislation on the health care industry and the affordable access are all important factors 
that Massachusetts can take into account for its future. The aforementioned aspects of the 
Taiwanese health care reform allowed for a better quality of health services, which is essential to 
health care reform in general. From the international case we discussed above, it is evident that 
the hospital cost and quality of health care are the two most significant measurements of the 
success of health care reform. In the following Literature Review section, we will discuss these 
two factors. 
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3.0 Literature Review 
 
The objective of this literature review will be to inform the reader of the effects of the 
Massachusetts health care reform on hospital costs and quality. We will first discuss examples of 
literature that examine how we could go about defining and researching hospital cost and quality. 
We will then discuss previous research that explored how hospital cost and quality were affected 
by the reform.  
 
3.1 How to Measure Hospital Cost  
 
In order to analyze the cost effects of the Massachusetts health care reform, the hospital is 
the primary focus. According to the “Analysis of Hospital Costs: A Manual for Managers” 
(Shepard et al., 1998), cost finding and cost analysis are the processes of utilizing accounting 
data to obtain the costs of hospital services.   
Shepard et al.‟s (1998) article described the concept of cost centers, which are the centers 
of activity in the hospital to which direct and indirect costs will be assigned. Based on the nature 
of their work, three different types of cost centers can be identified:  Patient Care, Intermediate 
and Overhead. Patient Care Centers are those departments that provide direct patient services, 
such as ambulatory care centers and wards. Intermediate cost centers provide ancillary services 
to support inpatient treatments such as laboratory, pharmacy and radiology departments. The 
third type, overhead cost centers, provides costs related to overhead support services such as 
departments of finance and dietetics. It would be useful to explore the Patient Care Centers and 
Intermediate Care Centers since it is these divisions of the hospital that residents come into direct 
contact with, which means they will be most likely affect by the reform. Therefore, it is these 
total operational costs and departments‟ salaries that will be used in our research, as they will be 
most informative as to how the reform affected hospital costs. In conclusion, the methods 
discussed in this article serve as a guide for research to be done on hospitals‟ operational costs. 
Based on the different types of cost centers defined by the article, one can identify which of these 
costs should be included in subsequent research (Shepard et al., 1998). Costs are not only 
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essential in evaluating the successes of the health care reform, but they are also essential to 
hospital structure and function, as will be discussed next. 
Decades ago, cost was not a primary concern. Consequently, hospitals had no incentive to 
invest in information and accounting systems. After the change in regulation in 1983, price 
became the primary basis of competition. Thus, cost became more and more important in 
measuring a hospital‟s overall performance. In order to maintain financial viability, hospitals had 
to increase their revenues by providing high-quality health care and lower their operating costs. 
As is stated by the DHCFP‟s “Study of the Reserves, Endowments, and Surpluses of Hospitals in 
Massachusetts,” hospitals need to manage their own financial resources to maintain operations, 
provide high-quality patient care and make investments in new services, infrastructure and 
technology (2010). Besides, under the most severe economic recession since Great Depression, 
many hospitals, with their significant declining profit margins, need to cut costs and lower 
research budgets and philanthropic giving. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for hospitals to 
increase their profitability and to control their costs in order to compete effectively against 
others. A hospital cannot remain financially viable without earning and maintaining adequate 
financial resources (Bigby & Morales, 2010). Hospital costs are not the only key factor that can 
be affected by the reform, however, as the quality of medical services a hospital provides is also 
very important. 
 
3.2 How to Measure the Quality of Health Services 
 
The definition of health care quality is broad and variable. The Institute of Medicine 
defines quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase 
the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional 
knowledge” (Institute of Medicine, 2010). Specifically, Campbell (2000) separates quality of 
care for both individual patients and populations into two categories: access and effectiveness. 
The most basic understanding of access to health care providers is geographic/physical access 
(Campbell, 2000). Effectiveness of health care is measured by an arrangement of diagnostic and 
treatment indicators that include the ability to prescribe drugs patients need and the ability to 
order diagnostic tests or procedures for patients (SteelFisher, 2009). 
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In SteelFisher‟s article, the quality of health care was realized as the amount of time 
patients wait to get an appointment to see physicians, physicians‟ ability to prescribe drugs the 
patients need, the costs that patients pay out of pocket for needed care, the amount of time 
physicians can spend with a patient, physicians‟ ability to order diagnostic tests or procedures for 
patients, the amount of time patients wait in the waiting room and other factors (SteelFisher, 
2010). Generally, in other research, timeliness and effectiveness of treatment are the key 
measurements of quality, both of which were present in Steelfisher‟s article. Other 
measurements, however, such as cost for patients and detailed measurements and the physician‟s 
ability to order diagnostic tests for patients tend to be omitted in a national report. An example of 
the National Healthcare Quality Report is shown below in which both effectiveness of treatment 
and timeliness is taken into account. 
Our research will take both access and efficiency into account, although our primary 
concern will be the latter, as it is the most likely factor to be affected by the Massachusetts health 
care reform. As one of the core federal agencies handling the national health care issue, the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality publishes the National Healthcare Quality Report 
annually. In its 2009 report, they used the specific outcomes and processes to measure the 
quality. Table 3 shows the details of some of these measurements. The measurements are 
selected from the full core measure set defined in 2005 by the Interagency Work Group. All core 
measures fall into two categories: process measures, which track receipt of medical services, and 
outcome measures, which reflect the results of medical care. 
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Table 3 Measurement of Health Care Quality by National Healthcare Quality Report 
Section Process measures Outcome measures 
Effectiveness: 
Cancer 
 Women age 40 and over  who 
reported they had a mammogram 
within the past 2 years 
 Rate of advanced stage 
breast cancer per 100,000 
women age 40 and over 
 Breast cancer deaths per 
100,000 women 
Effectiveness: 
Diabetes 
 Adults age 40 and over with 
diagnosed diabetes who received 
all three recommended services 
for diabetes in the calendar year 
(hemoglobin A1c measurement, 
dilated eye examination, and foot 
examination) 
 Hospital admissions for 
lower extremity amputation 
per 1,000 population age 18 
and over with diabetes 
Patient Safety 
 Adult surgery patients who 
received appropriate timing of 
antibiotics 
 Adults age 65 and over who 
received potentially 
inappropriate prescription 
medications 
 Adult surgery patients with 
postoperative complications  
 Bloodstream infections or 
mechanical adverse events 
associated with central 
venous catheter placement 
Timeliness N/A 
 Adults who needed care 
ASAP for an illness, injury, 
or condition in the last 12 
months who did not get care 
as soon as wanted 
 Emergency department 
visits in which patients left 
w/o being seen 
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The Health Care Quality and Cost Council (HCQCC) of Massachusetts, the state 
committee responsible for setting quality and cost policies and missions for the Commonwealth, 
uses the same table to measure quality of health care in Massachusetts. Their annual report, 
Measuring Health Care Quality and Cost in Massachusetts, described the health care quality and 
cost changes in the state (HCQCC, 2009). In our research, only the measurements that exist for 
all states will be used for comparison. The four major divisions that will be used are: surgery, 
pneumonia, heart attack and heart failure. Within these four divisions, there are detailed 
indicators for each hospital that are similar to those described above. The next section explores 
the various effects of the reform on health care quality. 
The aforementioned articles used essential indicators of the quality of hospital medical 
services, such as lengths of stay in the hospital, usage of emergency room and access to services 
which will remain important for further research. These articles addressed changes in the quality 
of Massachusetts health care services before and after the reform, but they neglected the 
comparison of these trends with other states to support the fact that they were products of the 
reform instead of a common trend across the nation. In our research, we will compare important 
measurements of hospital healthcare quality in Massachusetts, as well as Connecticut and 
Minnesota to determine whether or not the changes observed in Massachusetts can be attributed 
to the reform. 
As Eldenburg and Krishnan‟s article (2010) stated, the U.S. health care system previously 
encourage quality-based competition because there were virtually no incentives to control costs. 
Hospitals only competed to offer superior technology and extensive services to attract patients. 
The hospitals providing higher quality of health services formerly out-competed those providing 
lower quality of services in order to contain costs. This demonstrates that quality was extremely 
important in measuring a hospital‟s overall performance. 
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3.3 How to Measure Impacts of Reform on Hospital Cost and Quality 
 
The larger implication of our research is to measure the successes and failures of the 
reform in hopes that we can then learn from our mistakes before engaging in a national reform.  
Specifically, we will be measuring the changes in hospital cost and the quality of medical 
services the hospitals provide over a number of years for better insight on the effects of the 
reform. Recently, in 2009, the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research published an article 
describing how one might go about assessing the success of the reform based on the specific 
goals that it had, such as to provide a better quality of health care, while still containing the costs 
of doing so (Miltenberger & Poftak, 2009). Specifically, the reform addressed issues of cost and 
quality by mandating that hospitals report cost and quality measures that would be made 
available to the public and creating the Cost and Quality Council, which aimed to set standards 
for the quality of health care patients received.  
 The crux of our research is to focus on these cost containments and improvements in 
quality of health care efforts and measures.  In order to examine the reform‟s ability to contain 
costs, Miltenberger and Poftak suggest that research must explore cost and quality data that is 
available on a “periodic,” basis, which we hope to accomplish in our research.  Specifically, the 
authors suggest to look at spending on healthcare as a whole.  We will be researching hospital 
operational costs, as this accounts for half of total healthcare spending along with clinical and 
physician services (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009). 
 It is essential, as these two authors mentioned, to look at data over a period of time. In 
order to really evaluate the relative successes of the reform, as much pre-reform data as possible 
needs to be collected in order to be used as a basis for comparison or a control. Although it is 
important to explore cost containment after the reform, evaluating health care costs on a “whole” 
basis, as Miltenberger and Poftak mentioned, is not the most effective way to examine cost 
containment efforts, as there are so many factors that contribute to this spending that the impact 
of the reform will most likely be obscured. For measurement of hospital costs beyond changes in 
quantities and charges, Kolstad and Kowalski obtained all-payer cost to charge ratios on the 
hospital level. This ratio represents the annual total cost of operating the hospital. In order to 
accurately evaluate the impact of the reform on cost containment, specifically one level will be 
focused on in our research, which is the hospital, since it is the hospital that provides the medical 
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services that are also being evaluated in terms of quality. There are also aspects of hospital costs, 
however, that should not be taken into account, as they would not have been likely to be affected 
by the reform and will, therefore, add noise to the data. Therefore, it was decided that only 
hospital operation costs and department salaries over a period of time will be examined, as in 
Kolstad and Kowalski‟s research.   
In order to examine the progress in quality of care improvement, Miltenberger and Poftak 
suggest to research various quality indicators, such as mortality rates, rate of nosocomial 
infections (infections due to medical procedures), and effectiveness of heart surgery, while 
comparing it to indicators of other states (Miltenberger and Poftak, 2009). Important quality 
indicators will also be examined in our research. Specifically, the four major divisions of 
indicators will be heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia and surgery because annual quality data 
are provided on the treatment of these four conditions by the Medicare Hospital Compare 
Quality of Care Database. Those indicators will be measured in terms of appropriateness of 
treatment given, medical advice and preventative measures taken, just as suggested by 
Miltenberger and Poftak‟s research. Multiple states will be looked at as this article mentioned, 
which is essential in order to determine whether or not these impacts were due to the reform or 
some other trend. This article neglected to mention, however, that the control states used should 
have similar quality of health care to Massachusetts before the reform, in order to be a 
meaningful comparison. 
A report that was later issued in the Pioneer Institute attempted to respond to 
Miltenberger and Poftak‟s suggested techniques for research. In their study, a metric system was 
used in order to assess their performance and whether or not they achieved their goals (Lischko 
& Manzolillo, 2010). Grades that they used in their assessment were A, which signifies 
“excellent performance and that the goal as achieved”, B, which signifies “good performance 
and that the goal was moderately achieved,” C, which signifies “mixed results and a need for 
research,” D, which signifies “poor performance and that the goal was not achieved” and lastly, a 
grade of I, which signifies that enough research is not available in order to assess the 
performance (Lischko and Manzolillo, 2010). Just like our own research, they addressed changes 
in the three quality indicators as compared to other states. In similar research, Kolstad and 
Kowalski assessed changes in the quality of medical services by analyzing the length of stay of 
patients, as well as the number of discharges. They indicated that both of these factors would be 
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helpful in determining the overall efficiency of health care (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2010). 
Although these data give an overall view of how often and for how long patients visit the 
hospital, these indicators are somewhat general and seem to focus on the accessibility of care. 
From their findings of decreases in the length of stay and decreases in the number of discharges, 
they concluded that there was an improvement in the overall quality of medical care given 
(Kolstad & Kowalski, 2010). However, these data do not directly address effectiveness of 
treatment, as we will address through our specific quality indicators.   
In their data analysis, Lischko and Manzolillo provided graphical analysis on patients‟ 
receipt of preventative antibiotics and the end of their treatment after surgery, as compared to 
other states and the national average. They also specifically compared the percentage of patients 
receiving effective care and preventative treatments, as well as patients receiving appropriate 
care for heart attack, heart failure and pneumonia. These percentages, however, were only taken 
into account for the years 2007 and 2009, both of which are post-reform. It is evident that the 
measures of treatment for heart attack, heart failure and pneumonia are very important in 
determining the quality of medical services, however these percentages lack detail in specific 
indicators within these three divisions that give the reader or other researchers an idea of what 
medical treatment the patient received. Multiple analyses can be used in order to evaluate the 
effect of the reform on quality of medical services.   
In order to further analyze their findings, Kolstad and Kowalski also used difference-in-
differences estimates. The factors analyzed using difference-in-differences analysis were the 
impact of the reform on the number of medical procedures performed per patient and the total 
cost per patient. This analysis performed on data before and after the reform, as well as for other 
control states of New England demonstrated that in Massachusetts the reform reduced the 
number of medical procedures conducted and that costs per patient also decreased (Kolstad & 
Kowalski, 2010). This difference-in-differences analysis will also be used in our own research in 
order to detect any changes in hospital operational costs, salaries or quality indicators after the 
reform, as compared to the chosen control states, Connecticut and Wisconsin. This type of 
analysis is significant because it allows one to associate any trends in data with the focus of 
study, the Massachusetts health care reform.  
For further analysis, Kolstad and Kowalski also generated a model, which aimed to 
demonstrate all of the variables that affect the cost of procedures and how they could be 
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calculated. In their model, they included such variables as the listed price of a procedure, which 
is based on the diagnosis related group (a system used to identify prices of particular procedures 
depending on the medical condition) and the discount due to insurance coverage. In their model, 
the listed group and the discount due to insurance are multiplied to find the cost of the medical 
procedure. Because such a model really validates the essential factors in determining cost and 
quality values, we will be generating our own model for calculating the total hospital operational 
costs and the quality of medical services, in hopes that it will accurately portray the trends we 
find.  
 
3.4 Conclusion and Hypotheses 
 
In conclusion, effective methods allow us to quantify both hospital cost and the quality of 
health care in order to monitor changes over a period of time. The relationship between these two 
factors and their importance has also been thoroughly researched. However, there is no research 
focusing on the effects of the current Massachusetts health care reform on cost, quality and 
salaries. The purpose of our research is to determine the effects of the reform on hospital costs, 
quality of health care and salaries. One of the main goals of the Massachusetts Health Care 
Reform is to improve the quality of health care services. In this project, we will try to determine 
whether or not they were successful in achieving this goal. Our hypothesis is that the 
Massachusetts quality of health care will improve after the reform, while that for the other states 
will remain unchanged or improve at a lower rate. The second goal of this reform was to contain 
hospital costs, according to our preliminary research. We will also try to determine whether or 
not this was achieved. Our second hypothesis is that the cost of Massachusetts hospital will 
remain relatively stable compared to other states. The Methodology section will describe the 
technical methods used to further explore the impacts on hospital cost, quality and salaries after 
the reform as compared to that of other states.  
 
  
29 
 
4.0 Methodology 
 
The main objective of this research is to explore the effects of the Massachusetts health 
care reform at the hospital level on costs and quality. Data on cost and quality will be collected 
from before and after the reform in order to determine how they have changed and whether or 
not the reform has a causal impact on hospital cost and quality of medical service. The hopes of 
this reform were to increase coverage and access to health care across the state. In order to 
accomplish this goal, it is possible that hospital costs and, therefore, quality of services will be 
affected in some way. It is hypothesized that hospital costs were contained and the quality of 
their service was improved as a result of the reform, but was that true? The analyses performed 
on the data collected will allow these questions to be answered and will conclude whether or not 
the results were just a common trend or truly a result of the reform, as hospital data from other 
states will also be utilized. Two states, Connecticut and Wisconsin, which provide health care of 
similar quality to Massachusetts and are somewhat similar economically will be used as control 
groups in order to test these hypotheses (Commonwealth Foundation, 2009). Financial 
statements of hospitals will be examined, as well as specific data on some indicators of the 
quality of medical services. The following section will describe the hypothesis testing. 
 
4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
 
The overall hypothesis that was tested is that the Massachusetts health care reform 
improved the quality of health care services provided by hospitals and contained hospital costs.  
In order to measure both quality and cost changes due to the reform, hospital-level data will be 
collected before and after the reform and be analyzed. Cost and quality data will also be 
collected for Connecticut, as well as for Wisconsin in order to determine whether the changes in 
Massachusetts can truly be attributed to the reform. The null hypothesis being tested is that the 
changes in cost and quality in Massachusetts‟ hospitals are due to a common trend. The 
alternative hypothesis, however, is that the cost and quality changes in Massachusetts‟ hospitals 
are due to the Massachusetts Health Care Reform. If the patterns of hospital cost and quality data 
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in the control states, Connecticut and Wisconsin, do not mimic those of Massachusetts, the 
alternative hypothesis will be supported and accepted. 
 
4.2 Data Collection Methods 
 
The data collection of this project is a very important stage. We tried to collect the data 
from the reliable sources, such as the government office or department. The reason is the 
unreliable data may affect the analysis results. In addition, we tried to collect the data as much as 
possible. The following subsection will provide more details about the sources we used and the 
data we collected. 
 
4.2.1 Hospital Cost Data Collection 
 
In order to collect sufficient hospital cost information, we obtained data from the Center 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), as the Medicare Providers are required to fill out the 
Hospital and Health Care Complexes, CMS 2552-96. The CMS then publishes all the collected 
complexes and provide it in electronic format for downloading
1
. Each complex contains several 
MS Excel worksheets, which are called forms. The table below is a list of these forms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1. Download address: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CostReports 
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Table 4 Components of CMS 2552-96 Form 
Form Index Form Name 
Form A Adjustments 
Form B Cost allocation based on cost center 
Form C Cost-to-Charge Ratios 
Form D Determining Costs 
Form F Financial Statements 
Form G Financial Statements 
Form H Determine provider based HHA Medicare 
Settlement 
Form I Determine provider based renal dialysis costs 
(Hospital) and RHC/FQHC (SNF) 
Form K Determine Provider based hospice Medicare 
costs 
Form L Determine provider Medicare capital payment 
Form M Determine RHC/FQHC Medicare settlement 
Form J Determine provider based CORF Medicare 
Settlement 
Form S Provider summary information 
 
Currently, on the CMS website, we can access the databases from the Fiscal Year 1996 to 
the Fiscal Year 2010. Each year‟s folder contains four Comma-Separated Values (CSV) files. 
Table 5 below shows the name of each file and the contents of each file. The specific year is 
indicated by XXXX. 
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Table 5 Contents of CSV files 
 
File Name Content 
hosp_xxxx_RPT.csv Report  variables and descriptive information, 
such as the record id, provider id, and the data 
that the cost report was submitted 
hosp_xxxx_ALPHA.csv The character and numeric values such as the 
provider address and if the hospital is teaching 
hospital 
hosp_xxxx_NMRC.csv Only numbers and wound include variables 
such as number of discharges, total number of 
beds and total cost by cost center 
hosp_xxxx_ROLLUP.csv  
 
In order to collect the data for each measurement, we input all the CSV files to MS 
Access and then used Access to query the data. The name and type of each column of each file 
are defined by the CMS (Appendix B). Each provider is assigned a unique ID, called Provider 
ID, by CMS. Each year, CMS will assign a unique ID for the submitted report, called Report ID, 
for each specific provider. Therefore, in this project, we used the Provider ID to organize the 
hospital and used the Report Record Number to get the data for each measurement. All the files 
for each year are organized and connected by the Report Record Number, as shown in Figure 4 
below. 
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Figure 4 Relational Tables in Access 
 
Because the data in CMS CSV file are organized by the location of the specific data in 
the Excel form, we needed to locate the costs and salary values first. The coordinate of each 
measurement includes three filed: worksheet number, line number, and column number, as 
shown in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 Data Organization in CMS 
 
In addition, we needed to identify the variable as either character or numeric because they 
are included in different tables. For instance, if we would look for the number of beds in the file 
hosp_xxxx_NUMR.csv because the variable is coded as characters. To determine the teaching 
status of a hospital, we would check the contents in the file hosp_xxxx_ALPHA.csv because the 
data should be a character. The table below shows the coordinate of each cost measurement we 
used for this project. 
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Table 6 Cost Measurement Used 
 
Measurement 
Name 
File Name 
Worksheet 
Number 
Worksheet 
Code
2
 
Line Code
3
 
Column 
Code
4
 
Total 
operation 
cost 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form G2 „G200000‟ „04000‟ „0200‟ 
Operation 
room salary 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form A „A000000‟ „03700‟ „0100‟ 
Radiology 
room salary 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form A „A000000‟ „04200‟ „0100‟ 
Respiratory 
therapy 
salary 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form A „A000000‟ „04900‟ „0100‟ 
Physical 
therapy 
salary 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form A „A000000‟ „05000‟ „0100‟ 
Electrocardio
logy salary 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form A „A000000‟ „05300‟ „0100‟ 
Emergency 
room salary 
hosp_xxxx_N
UMR 
Form A „A000000‟ „06100‟ „0100‟ 
 
In Access database, we used the query to collect all the data. Here is an example query of 
how we collected the total operation cost for the Fiscal Year 2009. The query is shown in SQL 
format. The queries for the rest of the measurements are shown in Appendix C. 
 
                                                             
2
 Used for querying 
3
 Used for querying, same as the line number in the specific worksheet 
4 Used for querying, same as the column number in the specific worksheet 
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SELECT Sheet1.[Hospital Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new 
ON Sheet1.[Hospital Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)="G200000") AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='04000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0200')); 
Figure 6 below shows the format of the queried data. 
 
Figure 6 Query Data 
 
4.2.2 Hospital Quality Data 
 
We collected the hospital quality data from the CMS Hospital Compare website
5
. Since 
2005, CMS released a hospital quality Access Database every quarter. In order to stay consistent 
in our research, we used the databases released in March every year.  
Each quality database contains several sub-databases. For this project, we only used three 
of them and Table 7 below describes each sub-database.  Table 8 then shows the specific quality 
of health care indicators that we used. 
                                                             
5 www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/11_HospitalCompare.asp 
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 Table 7 Quality sub-database 
Database Name Description 
Dbo_vwHQI_HOSP The basic information about each hospital 
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK The raw data for each measurement 
dbo vwHQI FTNT The footnote for each raw data item 
 
Table 8 Quality Database Measurements 
Measurement Name Database Name Variable Type 
Heart Attack Patients Given ACE 
Inhibitor or ARB for Left 
Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction 
(LVSD) 
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK Dependent Variable 
Heart Failure Patients Given 
Smoking Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK Dependent Variable 
Pneumonia Patients Given 
Smoking Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK Dependent Variable 
Pneumonia Patients Given the 
Most Appropriate Initial 
Antibiotic(s)   
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK Dependent Variable 
Surgery Patients Who Received 
Preventative Antibiotic(s) One 
Hour Before Incision 
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK Dependent Variable 
Surgery Patients Whose 
Preventative Antibiotic(s) are 
Stopped Within 24 hours After 
Surgery 
dbo vwHQI HOSP MSR XWLK Dependent Variable 
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The hospitals in the quality databases share the same Provider ID as the cost database. 
Therefore, it was convenient for us to connect both databases together. Since the quality database 
was already generated in MS Access format, we did not have to input the raw data into the 
database.  
 
4.2.3 Hospital List 
 
For our research, we chose all of the acute hospitals in the Massachusetts, Connecticut 
and Wisconsin. Also, we checked the quality data for each acute hospital and selected the 
hospitals which submitted the quality data every year. The detailed hospital list is shown in 
Appendix D. 
 
4.2.4 Population Data 
 
We also collected the population of the town where the hospital is located from the 
United States Census Office
6
. Since the last two censuses took place in 2000 and 2010, we used 
the estimated population given by the U.S. Census Office.  
 
4.2.5 Control Variable Collection 
 
We collected our control variable data from both cost databases and quality databases. 
Below is Table 9, which shows the coordinate of each variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 http://www.census.gov/ 
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Table 9 Control Variable Coordinate 
Measurement 
Name 
File Name Form Worksheet 
Code 
Line Code Column 
Code 
Number of 
Beds 
hosp_xxxx_NUMR Form S31 „S300001‟ „01200‟ „0100‟ 
If the hospital 
is teaching  
hospital? 
hosp_xxxx_ALPHA Form S2 „S200000‟ „02500‟ „0100‟ 
Ownership Dbo_vwHQI_HOSP N/A N/A N/A N/A 
If the hospital 
provides 
emergency 
service? 
Dbo_vwHQI_HOSP N/A N/A N/A N/A 
City Dbo_vwHQI_HOSP N/A N/A N/A N/A 
County Dbo_vwHQI_HOSP N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
4.3 Statistical Analysis 
 
In this research, statistical techniques were used to analyze data and evaluate the impacts 
of the reform.  The hospital operation cost data, as well as quality and salary data of 
Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin was analyzed and the measures of central tendency 
was calculated. These values helped to determine the trend of hospital operational cost. After 
computing the operational cost and department salaries, the change of the cost was determined 
and evaluated based on the reform. Standard deviation helped examine if the samples chosen 
reflected the general trends of hospital operation cost in these three states.  
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4.4 Difference-In-Differences 
 
Difference-In-Differences is a statistic and econometric technique used to measure the 
effect of a treatment at a given period in time (Econometrics, 2006). In our studies, we compared 
the hospital data before the Massachusetts health care reform against that after the reform to find 
the overall impacts of the reform on the hospital quality and operational costs. However, there 
were a lot of factors changing at the same time. For instance, there could have been a national 
trend for increasing quality and containing cost which may have affected the hospital operations 
in Massachusetts significantly. Therefore, in order to ensure that the changes in the hospital 
quality and operational costs were due to the reform rather than the national trend, we decided to 
use  a Difference-in-Differences technique. Connecticut and Wisconsin were used as control 
states since their hospital quality status, population size and health care coverage were similar to 
those in Massachusetts before the reform. In addition, these states did not enact any health care 
reform bill during our study period.  
The equation for the Difference-In-Differences regression is the following: 
Y=β0 + β1*(Time*MA) + β2*Time + β3*MA + ε    (Econometrics, 2006) 
In this equation, Y is the measurement of hospital operational cost and quality of medical 
service. β2*Time is a time dummy, MA is a state dummy for Massachusetts, and Time*MA is the 
interaction of the time dummy and the state dummy (a product of the two variables) 
(Econometrics, 2006).  
The chart below shows the time and the changes in hospital quality and cost in each state 
(Econometrics, 2006). As shown by the table below, “a” represents Connecticut before the 
reform, “d” represents Connecticut after the reform, “b” represents Wisconsin before the reform, 
“e” represents Wisconsin after the reform, “c” represents Massachusetts before the reform, “f” 
represents Massachusetts after the reform. 
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Table 10 Difference-in-Differences Variables Table (Econometrics, 2006) 
 Connecticut (control) Wisconsin (control) Massachusetts 
Before Reform A B c 
After Reform D E f 
 
The following chart in Table 11 describes what each coefficient in the equation 
represents (Econometrics, 2006).  
Table 11 Difference-in-Differences Table comparing CT and MA (Econometrics, 2006) 
Coefficient Calculation 
β0 a; c 
β1 (f-c)*(f-d) 
β2 f-c 
β3  c-a; f-d 
 
From the two charts above, one can see that β0 is the constant, β1 represents the causal 
effect of the reform, β2 measures the common time trend in all states after the reform, β3 captures 
the difference between Massachusetts and the control states (Econometrics, 2006). The 
difference-in-differences variables described above will be further explained below. 
 
4.5 Econometric Modeling of the Health Industry 
 
Econometric Modeling is “the quantitative analysis of actual economic phenomena based 
on the concurrent development of theory and observation related by appropriate methods of 
inference” (Samuelson, 1958). Econometric modeling can be used to estimate the dependent 
variables and their relationship in an economic system. 
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4.5.1 Cost Model 
 
The equations below are the econometric models for cost. The difference-in-differences 
variables, as shown below, are the impact of the reform, whether the data is before or after the 
reform, and the state from which the data was collected. The control variables include the size of 
the hospital, the type of the hospital, and city size (population of the city in which the hospital is 
located), whether it offers emergency services, and whether it is a teaching hospital, which will 
be explained in the Control Variables section. The dependent variables are total operational cost 
and salaries cost. 
 
YTotal Cost = β0 + β1Time* MA + β2Time + β3MA + β4Size + β5Teaching + β6Type + 
β7Emergency + β8Population + ε 
YSalary = β0 + β1Time*MA + β2Time + β3MA + β4Size + β5Teaching + β6Type + ε 
 
Dependent Variables: 
The following list includes all of the dependent variables used in the cost model. 
YCost: Total Operational Cost  Adjusted by Inflation 
We used total operational cost as the dependent variable in our model. This cost is 
adjusted with the inflation rate to get the actual values. We then used the real cost to evaluate the 
overall impacts of the reform on the hospital operational cost. 
  
YSalary: Salaries Cost Adjusted by Inflation 
We used physician salaries from different departments such as the Operating Room, 
Radiology Room, Respiratory Therapy, Physical Therapy, Electrocardiology and Emergency 
Room. All these costs were adjusted with the inflation rate to get more realistic values. 
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Difference-in-Differences Variables: 
MA*Time (Dummy Variable):  MA*Time = 1 if a hospital is in Massachusetts and is after 
reform. Otherwise, MA*Time = 0 
The reform variable described above is the most important variable in our model as it 
shows the impact of the reform on the cost. We expect β1 to be close to zero because the target of 
the Massachusetts health care reform is to contain hospital cost. 
 
Time (Dummy Variable): Time = 1 if the hospital data is after reform (the first 2 years from July 
2004 to June 2006 are pre-reform). Time = 0 if the hospital data is after reform (the later 3 years 
from July 2006 to June 2009 are post-reform). 
The time variable compares the pre-reform conditions to the post-reform conditions. In 
our model, we consider FY2005 and FY2006 as pre-reform and FY2007, FY2008 and FY2009 
as post-reform. We expect β2 to be positive because the hospital operational costs in all three 
states are expected to increase over time.  
 
MA (Dummy Variable): State = 1 if the hospital data is in Massachusetts. State = 0 if the hospital 
data is in Connecticut or Wisconsin 
MA is the state variable which compares the hospitals in Massachusetts against those in 
Connecticut and Wisconsin. Our hypothesis is that β3 of Massachusetts should be close to zero as 
the operational cost is expected to be contained in Massachusetts compared to  Connecticut and 
Wisconsin.  
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Control Variables: 
 
Cost Equation found in Literature Review  
 
The function above shows the relationship between total cost and different control 
variables. In the function, ai1 is the total cost. Sio is the size of the ith hospital in the first period, 
Pi and Mi are dummy variables indicating the hospital's location; ATi and Ti are dummy variables 
representing the hospital's teaching status (Lave & Lave, 1970). 
 
 
The city size, teaching status hospital size definitely have some effects on the costs and 
quality of services of a hospital (Lave & Lave, 1970). In addition, in another article written by 
Sloan et al. (2001), the hospital ownership was considered as one of the variables that will 
impact on the hospital operational cost.  
 
Size (Dummy Variable): Size = Extra Large if >400, Large if <400 and >200, Medium if <200 
and >100, Small if <100. 
Size is the hospital size variable. We classified all the hospitals into four different 
categories based on their number of beds. These categories include Extra Large, Large, Medium 
and Small. We expect β4 of Extra Large to be positive since big hospitals have higher operational 
costs. 
 
Teaching (Dummy Variable): Teaching = 1 if the hospital is teaching hospital. Otherwise, 
Teaching = 0 
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Teaching is the teaching hospital variable. We expect that β5 will be positive because 
teaching hospitals have higher costs than nonteaching hospitals. 
 
Type (Dummy Variable): Proprietary, Governmental and Non-profit. 
Type is the hospital type variable. There are three types of hospitals: Proprietary, Non-
profit and Governmental . We expect that β6 of Non-profit are positive because nonprofit 
hospitals have higher operational costs than other hospitals. 
 
Emergency (Dummy Variable): Emergency Service (Emergency = 1 if the hospital provides 
emergency service. Otherwise, Emergency = 0) 
Emergency is the Emergency Service variable. We expect β7 to be positive since the 
hospital with emergency service are expected to have higher operational costs. 
 
City Size (Continuous Variable): The population size of a city divided by fifty thousand 
We hypothesize that β8 will be  positive since the bigger the city, the higher the 
operational cost for the hospital.   
 
4.5.2 Quality Model 
 
The equations below are an econometric model for the quality of medical services. The 
dependent variables are the different measurements of medical services. The difference-in-
differences variables include the impact of the reform, whether the data is before or after the 
reform, the state from which the data was collected. The control variables are the size of the 
hospital, whether it is a teaching hospital, its ownership, whether or not it offers emergency 
services and the population of the city in which the hospital is located. Several articles that are 
mentioned below show that these control variables above have effects on the Massachusetts 
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health care reform. Therefore, we can use them in our model to find the overall impacts of the 
reform on hospital quality (Sloan, Picone, Jr., & Chou, 2001 & Keeler, et al., 1992). 
 
Yquality = β0 + β1Time*MA + β2Time + β3MA + β4Size + β5Teaching + β6Type + β7Emergency + 
β8 Population +  ε 
 
Dependent Variables: 
The following list includes all of the dependent variables used in the quality model. 
Yquality (Continuous Variable):  
Heart Attack Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular Systolic 
Dysfunction (LVSD);  
Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice/Counseling;  
Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice/Counseling;  
Pneumonia Patients Given the Most Appropriate Initial Antibiotic(s);  
Surgery Patients Who Received Preventative Antibiotic(s) One Hour Before Incision;  
Surgery Patients Whose Preventative Antibiotic(s) are Stopped Within 24 hours After 
Surgery                                                    
As demonstrated above, we have six different indicators to measure the quality of 
medical services in the quality model. We used them separately to see the overall effects of the 
reform on  hospital quality.  
  
Difference-in-Differences Variables: 
The following list includes the Difference-in-Differences variables. 
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MA*Time (Dummy Variable): Already described above. 
MA* Time is the most important variable in our model, symbolizing the impact of the 
reform on the quality. Because the target of the Massachusetts health care reform is to improve 
quality, we expect β1 to be positive. 
 
Time (Dummy Variable): Already described above 
As mentioned before, in our model, we consider 2005 and 2006 as pre-reform and 
thereafter as post-reform. The quality of health care will be improved over the years, so we 
expect that β2 to be positive. 
 
MA (Dummy Variable): Already described above 
Our hypothesis is that β3 should be zero as the hospital quality status in Connecticut and 
Wisconsin are very similar to that in Massachusetts (State Data Center, 2009). 
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Control Variables: 
 
Figure 7 Control Variables Used in Previous Research (Keeler, et al., 1992) 
Before selecting our control variable, we conducted some preliminary research. As 
shown above in Figure 7, the city size, teaching status, ownership and hospital size definitely 
have some meaningful impacts on the effects of the reform (Keeler, et al., 1992). We also 
included the emergency service in our model because we consider the hospitals which provide 
emergency room services as ones that provide higher overall quality of care.   
 
Size (Dummy Variable): Already described above  
Just as in the cost model, we classified all the hospitals into four different categories 
based on their number of beds. These categories include Extra Large, Large, Medium and Small. 
We expect β4 of Extra Large to be positive since, as the previous table shows, big hospitals have 
better quality of care. For other variables, we expect that their values are negative.  
 
Teaching (Dummy Variable): Already described above 
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We expect that β5 is positive because, as the table shows, teaching hospital offers much 
better medical services than nonteaching hospitals. 
 
Type (Dummy Variable): Already described above 
Just as in the cost model, we classified the three types of hospitals as: Proprietary, Non-
profit and Governmental. We expect that β6 of Non-profit hospitals are positive because 
according to an article reviewed, nonprofit hospitals provide better quality of cares than other 
types of hospitals (Sloan, Picone, Jr., & Chou, 2001). We also hypothesize that the beta values of 
Proprietary and Governmental are negative (Sloan, Picone, Jr., & Chou, 2001). 
 
Emergency (Dummy Variable): Already described above 
Emergency is the Emergency Service variable. We expect β7 to be positive since as we 
said previously, the hospitals with emergency service are expected to have higher quality of care. 
 
Population (Continuous Variable): Already described above 
Population is the city size variable. It measures the population of a city or town in which 
the hospital operates. In our model, we divided the population size by fifty thousand. We 
hypothesize that β8 will be positive as the table above shows that hospitals in bigger cities offer 
better medical services than those in smaller cities.   
 
4.6 Regression Analysis 
 
Regression techniques were utilized to determine the relationships between hospital 
operation cost factors, department salaries, as well as quality of medical services, and the reform. 
The purpose of this regression analysis was to assess the accuracy of the models we generated.  
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In other words, we determined how well the independent variables could be used to predict the 
values of the dependent variables (Bell, 2011). 
The hospital cost data that was collected from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), as well as the hospital quality data collected from the Medicare Hospital 
Compare Quality of Care Database was entered into “Statistical Package for the Social Sciences” 
(SPSS) and was organized by variable and hospital. Descriptive statistics were then performed 
on the data (using SPSS) in order to eliminate any outliers that could skew the results of the 
regression.  Minimum and maximum were used to find such outliers, which included a total 
operational cost of 0 for Umass Memorial of Massachusetts in 2009 and over 17,000 beds in 
Mercy Medical Center of Wisconsin in 2009. This number of beds is an outlier, as it is 
unrealistically large. The total operational cost outlier was deleted and the number of beds of 
2008 for Mercy Medical Center was substituted for 2009. 
As seen from the models presented above in Section 4.5, the dependent variable for the 
cost model was the total hospital operational cost and the independent variables included 
multiple control variables, such as hospital size (determined by the number of beds), whether it is 
a teaching hospital, ownership of hospital (whether it is non-profit, proprietary or governmental), 
city size (population of the city the hospital is located in) and whether it offers emergency 
services. Dependent variables for the salary models include the salary of the emergency room, 
operating room, radiology department, physical therapy department, and electrocardiology 
department, while the independent variables remain the same as for total cost except that the 
emergency services dummy variable and city population are eliminated. All total operational cost 
and salary values were first adjusted depending on the inflation rate of that year before being 
used in the regression. The dependent variable for the quality model was the pneumonia, heart 
attack, heart failure, or surgery patient indicators collected through the database. In the quality 
model, control variables, such as hospital size, whether it is a teaching hospital, city size and 
whether it offers emergency services were included. We expect all of the control variables to 
affect cost and quality, as we have found literature and previous research to support this.  
However, the most significant variables that are included in both of the cost and quality models 
are the difference-in-differences variables, which include the state, the year and the “reform 
variable,” β1MA*Time, which is a product of the two.  Separate regressions were run for cost 
and quality, as well as department salaries, and we the results generated for the reform variable 
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were used to determine whether or not the reform has truly affected hospital cost and quality. 
Specifically, we looked at the R-Squared value generated, which measures how successful the 
regression is. A value of 1.00 means that the independent variables flawlessly predict the 
dependent variables. The significance of the model was also used to measure how meaningful 
the results of the regression are, as well as the significance of the specific coefficients.  P-values 
close to 0 symbolize a greater significance. Finally, the beta value was looked at in order to 
determine specifically how the variables relate to each other. For example, a negative beta value 
means that the independent variable has a negative effect on the dependent variable, while a 
positive beta value means just the opposite. 
Ideally, we were looking for an  R-Squared value close to 1 to indicate that our 
independent variables do predict our dependent variables. Although, we expected all of the 
control variables to be significant, we paid most attention to whether or not the reform variable is 
significant. If the reform really did affect hospital cost and quality in the way that was planned, 
then the state and time should show significance in determining hospital cost and quality. If this 
was true, then Massachusetts would have a higher quality of medical services after the reform 
and contained costs, while the other states would not show such trends. 
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5.0 Results 
The following results will present the collected hospital cost and quality data and analyze 
the trends found. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In total, we collected the hospital quality and cost data from 153 hospitals from 
Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin. Specifically, we collected the information from 30 
hospitals from Connecticut, 61 hospitals from Massachusetts and 62 from Wisconsin. All of the 
hospitals are acute care hospitals.  
In the following section, we will discuss the hospital ownership in each state based on the 
definition given by CMS. In CMS list, the hospitals are separated into thirteen classes, which are 
listed in following table. 
 
Table 12 Hospital Ownership Code 
Ownership Code Description of Ownership 
1 Voluntary Nonprofit, Church 
2 Voluntary Nonprofit, Other 
3 Proprietary, Individual 
4 Proprietary, Corporation 
5 Proprietary, Partnership 
6 Proprietary, Other 
7 Governmental, Federal 
8 Governmental, City-County 
9 Governmental, County 
10 Governmental, State 
11 Governmental Hospital District 
12 Governmental, City 
13 Governmental, Other 
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Table 13 below shows categorizes the hospitals in each state by ownership, size, whether 
it is a teaching hospital and whether or not it offers emergency services. 
 
Table 13 Descriptive Statistics of Hospital Sample 
Variable Massachusetts Connecticut Wisconsin 
Ownership 
Governmental 1 1 1 
Proprietary 5 1 4 
Non profit 55 28 57 
Size 
Extra Large 7 4 5 
Large 15 8 9 
Medium 25 11 22 
Small 14 7 26 
Teaching 35 17 24 
Emergency 56 29 60 
 
In Connecticut, 28 hospitals, which are 93% of total hospital in Connecticut, are 
voluntary non-profit hospitals and 58% of them are private sector. For the rest hospitals, one of 
them  is a government funded hospital and one is a proprietary hospital. Approximately 36% of 
the hospitals are medium sized and there is almost an equal number of large and small hospitals. 
About 57% are teaching hospitals and all but one hospital offer emergency services. 
In Massachusetts, the voluntary non-profit hospital is still the largest group, which takes 
90% of the total. Among these non-profit hospitals, 34 of them are in the private sector and 6 of 
them are owned by church. For the rest hospitals, five hospitals are governmental and one of 
them is proprietary. About 43% of the hospitals are medium sized and there are equal numbers of 
large and small hospitals. Only about 12% are extra large hospitals. Nearly 60% are teaching 
hospitals and all but two hospitals offer emergency services. 
57 of the Wisconsin hospitals are voluntary non-profit hospitals. More than half of them 
are private non-profit hospitals and 18 of them are church owned hospitals, which is the largest 
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amongst these three states. Besides these non-profit hospitals, only one hospital is funded by 
government, which is different from other states. The other four are proprietary hospitals. 
Approximately 42% of hospitals are small and 35% are medium sized. About 39% are teaching 
hospitals and all but two offer emergency services. 
 
5.2 Summary Statistics 
 
The following tables and text will present the summary statistics of the collected data, 
such as the mean and standard deviation. Table 14 below contains the hospital size data of our 
sample. The data we analyzed here is from July 2004 till June 2009. We separate these 5 years 
data into two groups: pre-reform and post-reform. We defined the first 2 years, which is from 
July 2004 to June 2006 as pre-reform. Then we defined the later 3 years, which is from July 2006 
to June 2009 as post-reform. 
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Table 14 Summary Statistics of Dependent  Variables 
Dependent Variables 
  MA CT  WI  
Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sample  
Size 
Cost  
  
 
  
    
Total Operating Cost (in millions) Hospital Total Operating Cost 281.892 345.831 302 246.777 205.741 149 169.571 172.442 285 
Physician Salaries (in millions) Hospital Physician Salaries          
          Operating Room Operating Room Physician Salaries 6.522 8.144 294 5.734 4.956 144 3.524 3.474 284 
          Radiology Room Radiology Room Physician Salaries 5.548 6.387 298 3.457 3.090 144 2.993 2.969 269 
          Respiratory Therapy Respiratory Therapy Physician Salaries 1.478 1.427 295 1.628 1.354 140 1.059 1.055 270 
          Physical Therapy Physical Therapy Physician Salaries 1.878 1.937 267 1.766 1.205 119 1.667 1.229 254 
          Electrocardiology Electrocardiology Physician Salaries 1.039 1.394 290 0.815 1.217 129 0.691 1.172 193 
          Emergency Room Emergency Room Physician Salaries 6.377 5.271 289 7.860 4.725 145 2.710 1.679 267 
Quality   
 
     
Heart Attack Heart Attack Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular 
Systolic Dysfunction (LVSD) 
0.836 0.210 209 0.828 0.213 106 0.851 0.245 196 
Heart Failure Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice/Counseling 0.808 0.212 143 0.861 0.221 75 0.869 0.181 183 
Pneumonia           
 Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice/Counseling 0.782 0.250 95 0.817 0.259 40 0.865 0.145 107 
               Pneumonia Patients Given the Most Appropriate Initial Antibiotic(s) 0.836 0.135 80 0.772 0.278 42 0.877 0.066 62 
Surgery           
 Surgery Patients Who Received Preventative  
Antibiotic(s) One Hour Before Incision 
0.905 0.093 147 0.898 0.061 75 0.923 0.062 156 
 Surgery Patients Whose Preventative Antibiotic(s) are  
Stopped Within 24 Hours After Surgery 
0.854 0.134 145 0.845 0.111 72 0.825 0.174 145 
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The table above is the summary statistics for the dependent variables in our models. As 
we can see clearly from the table, the total operational cost in Massachusetts is much higher than 
that in Connecticut and Wisconsin. This rule also applies to the department salaries. Concerning 
the quality of medical services, all the three states are at a similar level, which is why we decided 
to use Connecticut and Wisconsin as our control groups. Appendix G presents the trends of these 
dependent variables in a graphical format. 
The table below is the summary statistics of the control variables. As can be seen in the 
table, there are more small hospitals and fewer big hospitals in Wisconsin than in the other two 
states. We can also see that the nonprofit is the dominant ownership for all of the three states. 
The teaching hospital rates are much higher in Massachusetts and Connecticut than in 
Wisconsin. Most of the hospitals provide emergency care. Finally, the city size in which the 
hospital operates is much bigger in Massachusetts than in Connecticut or in Wisconsin. Table 16 
below contains the statistic results of the dependent variables in Massachusetts and Wisconsin 
before and after the reform.
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Table 15 Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Explanatory Variables 
MA CT WI 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hospital Size       
              Hospital_>400 0.115 0.319 0.133 0.341 0.077 0.268 
              Hospital_200-400 0.249 0.433 0.267 0.444 0.152 0.359 
              Hospital_100-200 0.403 0.491 0.360 0.482 0.348 0.477 
              Hospital_<100 0.233 0.423 0.240 0.429 0.423 0.495 
Ownership       
              Ownership _Governmental 0.016 0.127 0.033 0.180 0.016 0.126 
              Ownership _Proprietary 0.066 0.248 0.027 0.162 0.052 0.222 
              Ownership _Nonprofit 0.902 0.298 0.933 0.250 0.916 0.278 
Teaching Hospital 0.574 0.495 0.567 0.497 0.387 0.488 
Emergency Service 0.921 0.270 0.960 0.197 0.965 0.185 
Town Population_50K 3.228 4.441 1.307 0.849 1.880 3.179 
Sample Size 305  150  310  
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Table 16 Dependent Variables (Before Reform and After Reform) 
Explanatory Variables 
 MA CT 
Before Reform  After Reform Before Reform After Reform Simple DD 
Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
MA* 
TIME 
Std. Err. 
Cost  
  
 
  
      
Total Operating Cost    
(in millions) 
Hospital Total Operating Cost 272.080 352.266 122 288.505 342.249 180 221.748 177.058 60 263.650 222.388 89 -0.040 [60.416] 
Physician Salaries        
(in millions) 
Hospital Physician Salaries               
Operating Room Operating Room Physician Salaries 5.754 7.068 118 7.038 8.776 176 4.892 3.756 58 6.301 5.573 86 -0.010 [1.444] 
Radiology Room Radiology Room Physician Salaries 5.071 5.681 119 5.866 6.813 179 3.158 2.478 58 3.659 3.441 86 0.022 [1.102] 
Respiratory Therapy Respiratory Therapy Physician Salaries 1.355 1.274 117 1.560 1.519 178 1.499 1.204 56 1.714 1.446 84 -0.008 [0.283] 
Physical Therapy Physical Therapy Physician Salaries 1.680 1.631 109 2.015 2.117 158 1.530 1.034 48 1.925 1.291 71 -0.018 [0.376] 
Electrocariology Electrocardiology Physician Salaries 0.974 1.359 118 1.083 1.420 172 0.732 1.070 52 0.870 1.311 77 -0.013 [0.279] 
Emergency Room Emergency Room Physician Salaries 5.620 4.644 116 6.885 5.608 173 6.870 3.800 59 8.540 5.179 86 -0.035 [1.008] 
Quality   
 
          
 
Heart Attack Heart Attack Patients Given ACE 
Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular 
Systolic Dysfunction (LVSD) 
0.772 0.259 92 0.887 0.144 117 0.746 0.254 52 0.906 0.120 54 -0.104 [0.048] 
Heart Failure Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking 
Cessation Advice/Counseling 
0.685 0.238 58 0.892 0.143 85 0.808 0.207 28 0.893 0.225 47 0.274 [0.058]** 
Pneumonia                
 Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking 
Cessation Advice/Counseling 
0.611 0.288 38 0.896 0.129 57 0.526 0.320 10 0.913 0.139 30 -0.199 [0.086] 
               Pneumonia Patients Given the Most 
Appropriate Initial Antibiotic(s) 
0.781 0.110 32 0.873 0.138 48 0.510 0.333 8 0.834 0.228 34 -0.574 [0.081]*** 
Surgery                
 Surgery Patients Who Received 
PreventativeAntibiotic(s) One Hour 
Before Incision 
0.803 0.087 16 0.918 0.085 131 0.870 0.000 2 0.899 0.062 73 0.512 [0.060] 
 Surgery Patients Whose Preventative 
Antibiotic(s) are Stopped Within 24 
Hours After Surgery 
0.731 0.122 16 0.869 0.128 129 0.890 0.000 2 0.843 0.113 70 0.715 [0.094]** 
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Explanatory Variables 
 MA WI 
 
Before Reform 
 
After Reform 
 
Before Reform 
 
After Reform 
 
    Simple DD 
Definition  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sample 
Size 
MA* 
TIME 
Std. Err. 
Cost 
      
Total Operating Cost    
(in millions) 
Hospital Total Operating Cost 272.080 352.266 122 288.505 342.249 180 162.558 164.782 124 174.972 178.440 161 0.006 [44.586] 
Physician Salaries         
(in millions) 
Hospital Physician Salaries               
Operating Room Operating Room Physician Salaries 5.754 7.068 118 7.038 8.776 176 3.390 3.265 123 3.627 3.633 161 0.071 [1.023] 
Radiology Room Radiology Room Physician Salaries 5.071 5.681 119 5.866 6.813 179 2.928 2.841 117 3.042 3.072 152 0.057 [0.832] 
Respiratory Therapy Respiratory Therapy Physician Salaries 1.355 1.274 117 1.560 1.519 178 1.010 1.018 118 1.096 1.084 152 0.036 [0.208] 
Physical Therapy Physical Therapy Physician Salaries 1.680 1.631 109 2.015 2.117 158 1.574 1.071 111 1.740 1.338 143 0.050 [0.278] 
Electrocariology Electrocardiology Physician Salaries 0.974 1.359 118 1.083 1.420 172 0.614 0.962 85 0.751 1.316 108 -0.009 [0.237] 
Emergency Room Emergency Room Physician Salaries 5.620 4.644 116 6.885 5.608 173 2.543 1.506 116 2.839 1.797 151 0.100 [0.655] 
Quality   
 
    
Heart Attack Heart Attack Patients Given ACE 
Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular 
Systolic Dysfunction (LVSD) 
0.772 0.259 92 0.887 0.144 117 0.826 0.231 78 0.868 0.253 118 0.392 [0.050]*** 
Heart Failure Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking 
Cessation Advice/Counseling 
0.685 0.238 58 0.892 0.143 85 0.753 0.222 54 0.918 0.135 129 0.281 [0.036]* 
Pneumonia                
 Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking 
Cessation Advice/Counseling 
0.611 0.288 38 0.896 0.129 57 0.800 0.168 42 0.907 0.111 65 0.399 [0.027]** 
               Pneumonia Patients Given the Most 
Appropriate Initial Antibiotic(s) 
0.781 0.110 32 0.873 0.138 48 0.864 0.059 32 0.891 0.072 30 -0.412 [0.051]** 
Surgery                
 Surgery Patients Who Received 
Preventative Antibiotic(s) One Hour 
Before Incision 
0.803 0.087 16 0.918 0.085 131 0.877 0.061 18 0.929 0.060 138 0.392 [0.050]*** 
 Surgery Patients Whose Preventative 
Antibiotic(s) are Stopped Within 24 
Hours After Surgery 
0.731 0.122 16 0.869 0.128 129 0.591 0.266 18 0.858 0.127 127 0.281 [0.036]* 
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The tables above just compare the dependent variables before reform against those after 
reform in all the three states. As we can see from the tables above, the cost increases after the 
reform for all the three states. The total cost, however, was relatively contained in Massachusetts 
and Wisconsin, where it increased by about 6% and 7.5%, respectively.  In Connecticut, the total 
cost increased by about 19%. The operating room salary increased significantly in Massachusetts 
and Connecticut by about 23% and 31%, respectively, while it only increased by about 6% in 
Wisconsin. The emergency room salary increased in Massachusetts and Connecticut by 21% and 
25%, respectively, and it only increased in Wisconsin by about 12%. The smaller departments 
showed similar trends in all of the states and the quality of services increased in all states after 
the reform. For Connecticut, only three of the simple DD regressions yielded significant values, 
which were the quality regressions for heart failure, pneumonia patients receiving the most 
appropriate antibiotic and surgery patients no longer receiving antibiotics 24 hours after surgery. 
For the heart failure and surgery patients, the reform had a positive impact, while it had a 
negative impact for pneumonia patients. It also indicates that the quality improves after the 
reform in all the three states. For the comparison with Wisconsin, all of the quality regressions 
were significant, indicating that the reform positively impacted all of the quality indicators 
except for pneumonia patients who are no longer receiving antibiotic. Although, it is useful to 
run the simple difference-in-differences regressions, one must keep in mind that these p-values 
are subject to change once all of the control variables are included.  
Table 17 below is the comparison table for the control variables before and after the 
reform in Massahusetts and Connecticut. As we can see from Table 17, there are not many 
changes between the values before the reform and those after the reform. The next section will 
describe all of our generated regression analysis results. 
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Table 17 Control Variables (Before Reform and After Reform) 
 
Explanatory Variables 
                 MA CT WI 
Before Reform After Reform Before Reform After Reform Before Reform After Reform 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hospital Size             
              Hospital_>400 0.115 0.320 0.115 0.320 0.133 0.343 0.133 0.342 0.073 0.260 0.081 0.273 
              Hospital_200-400 0.246 0.432 0.251 0.435 0.267 0.446 0.267 0.445 0.153 0.362 0.151 0.359 
              Hospital_100-200 0.410 0.494 0.399 0.491 0.367 0.486 0.356 0.481 0.355 0.480 0.344 0.476 
              Hospital_<100 0.230 0.422 0.235 0.425 0.233 0.427 0.244 0.432 0.419 0.495 0.425 0.496 
Ownership             
Ownership _Governmental 0.016 0.128 0.016 0.127 0.033 0.181 0.033 0.181 0.016 0.126 0.016 0.126 
Ownership _Proprietary 0.082 0.275 0.055 0.228 0.033 0.181 0.022 0.148 0.065 0.247 0.043 0.203 
Ownership _Nonprofit 0.902 0.299 0.902 0.299 0.933 0.252 0.933 0.251 0.911 0.285 0.919 0.273 
Teaching Hospital 0.574 0.497 0.574 0.496 0.567 0.500 0.567 0.498 0.387 0.489 0.387 0.488 
Emergency Service 0.926 0.262 0.918 0.275 0.967 0.181 0.956 0.207 0.968 0.177 0.962 0.191 
Town Population_50K 3.169 4.342 3.267 4.517 1.304 0.853 1.309 0.850 1.871 3.178 1.886 3.188 
Sample Size 122  183  60  90  124  186  
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5.3 Results of Regression Analysis  
 
As was previously described above in the Methodology section, a series of three 
regressions were run: for cost, for quality, and for department salaries. This section will describe 
the results that were generated by SPSS, starting with total cost in Table 18 below. 
 
5.3.1 Total Cost 
 
The regression run on the total cost model generated an R-Squared value of about 0.736, 
which means that the dependent variables predicted total cost fairly accurately. As can be seen 
from Table 16 above, the variable with  the reform variable is insignificant, as well as the 
dummy variable symbolizing which state the data was obtained. The other control variables of 
hospital size, ownership, whether it is a teaching hospital and city population are all very 
significant with significance values close to 0. Time and whether the hospital offers emergency 
services appear to be slightly less important with values closer to 0.1, but are still significant. 
From the beta values presented in Table 18, it is evident that larger hospitals, teaching hospitals, 
nonprofit and government-owned hospitals have a higher total cost. Total cost is also higher in 
Massachusetts and larger towns. 
 
5.3.2 Salaries 
 
We also ran regressions on models for various department salaries. Since we do not 
expect many of the smaller departments to be affected by the reform because they were not 
particularly targeted by any of the reform efforts, we will include those in Appendix B. The R-
squared value for the regression for the emergency room salary  was  0.429, which is somewhat 
meaningful, considering our independent variables accurately predicted our dependent variable 
about half of the time. The reform variable is insignificant, as it generated a value of 0.369. As 
can be seen from the results above, most of the control variables were significant except for the 
dummy variable indicating nonprofit hospitals. The dummy variable indicating medium hospital 
size and the dummy variable indicating time were significant with values around 0.05. Beta 
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values showed that larger hospitals had a larger emergency room salary and that salaries were 
also higher for teaching hospitals. The emergency room salaries were also higher in 
Massachusetts. The R-squared value for the operating room salary regression is 0.591, which is 
slightly higher than that generated for the emergency room salary regression, and very 
meaningful. The reform variable is insignificant, as it generated a value of 0.362. As exemplified 
by the values above, there is a lot of variance in the significance of the independent variables in 
this regression. Variables for size, teaching hospitals, and whether the hospital is located in 
Massachusetts were most significant with values from 0 to close to 0.05. Other variables, such as 
the reform variable, whether the hospital is located in Connecticut, and ownership are all 
insignificant with values between 0.345 and 0.777. Beta values indicated that larger and teaching 
hospitals had higher salaries. Hospitals in Massachusetts also had higher operating room salaries. 
Generally, the trend in the cost and salary regressions seemed to be that the reform variable was 
insignificant, but there were generally higher costs and salaries in Massachusetts. 
 
5.3.3 Quality 
 
Table 18 above also includes the quality results. The R-Squared value for the quality of 
medical services administered to heart attack patients is much smaller than that above for total 
cost at a value of 0.105, meaning that the independent variables do not have a very strong 
correlation with the dependent variable. The reform variable generated a significance value of 
0.582, which is insignificant. As can be seen from the significance values above, there is much 
more variability in the values than those generated from the total cost regression. The variables 
that were most significant with significance values of 0 were time and whether or not the hospital 
was a teaching hospital. Whether or not the hospital provided emergency services, was also 
somewhat significant with a significance value of 0.089.  Other variables had much higher p-
values, all above 0.2 (except for the dummy value symbolizing if the data was obtained from 
Massachusetts), and most of which were closer to 0.5 or higher.  It is demonstrated by the 
generated beta values that teaching hospitals provide a higher quality of medical services, which 
was also supported by our preliminary research. It was also shown that quality generally 
increased with time for all of the states. 
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The R-Squared value for the quality model for heart failure patients is still low at 0.326, 
although it is significantly higher than that for heart attack patients. It is worth noting that the 
reform variable seems to be significant here with a value of 0.068. It also generated a positive 
beta value, indicating that the reform had a positive impact on the quality of medical services for 
heart failure patients. As seen above, the p-values of the variables in this model also greatly vary 
from 0 to almost 0.7 for the dummy variable “IF_CT.” The city population size and the dummy 
variable “OWN_GOV” also seem to not be significant. However, the other control variables are 
significant with values close to 0. The beta values indicated that all states had increased quality 
of medical services over time and that there was increased quality in larger hospitals and larger 
cities. However, there was a lower level of quality service provided in teaching hospitals, which 
does not coincide with our preliminary research. There was also a lower level of quality services 
provided in Massachusetts hospitals. 
The R-Squared value for the quality of medical services of pneumonia patients receiving 
medical advice for smoking cessation is the highest yet for the quality models with a value of 
0.438. As can be seen from the values presented above in Table 10, the reform variable was 
extremely significant with a value of 0.001. This means that the reform almost perfectly 
predicted the quality of treatment of pneumonia patients, which, in this case, was medical advice 
concerning smoking cessation. The regression also yielded a positive beta value, demonstrating 
that the reform increased the quality of services administered to these patients. All of the control 
variables except for the dummy variable for nonprofit hospitals and that for city population were 
significant. Whether the hospital offered emergency services and the dummy variable for 
whether or not the hospital was located in the state of Connecticut were also significant with 
values closer to 0.03. Beta values indicated that the reform, time, hospitals offering emergency 
services and larger hospitals all provided a higher quality of medical services for pneumonia 
patients receiving medical advice. Governmentally owned hospitals and teaching hospitals 
offered a lower quality of medical services.   
The regression for pneumonia patients receiving the most appropriate antibiotic was 
similar in terms of the R-squared value, which was 0.450. The reform variable was insignificant 
with a p-value of 0.768. As can be seen above, many of the control variables, such as the dummy 
variable for ownership, the dummy variable indicating a large hospital, the dummy variable 
indicating the hospital is located in Massachusetts is insignificant. The reform variable is 
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insignificant, which is unlike some of the other quality regressions. Variables such as whether 
the hospital offers emergency services, city population, time and whether the hospital is located 
in Connecticut generated significant values, all close to 0. Whether the hospital was a teaching 
hospital and extra large hospitals were also significant. Beta values demonstrated that 
Connecticut hospitals provided a lower quality of care. The level of quality was increased, 
however, for larger towns and hospitals that offered emergency services. Quality also increased 
in all states with time. 
The R-squared value generated  for surgery patients receiving an antibiotic one hour after 
incision was 0.139, which is significantly low. Such a low value suggests that our independent 
variables are not very strong predictors or our dependent variable, quality of medical services of 
surgery patients. As can be seen from the results above, the reform variable is significant in this 
regression, along with the other difference-in-differences variables for determining which state 
the hospital is in and time. It is interesting that the variables relating to reform, such as time and 
state are significant, which is not common in the other regressions, while some of control 
variables are insignificant. Quality for surgery patients receiving antibiotics increased with the 
reform and time. Quality was generally lower, however, in Massachusetts and Connecticut than 
Wisconsin.   
The R-squared value for surgery patients who were no longer on antibiotic after 24 hours 
is 0.221, which is significantly low, but is consistent with some of the other R-squared values 
generated from the quality regressions. The reform variable is significant with a value of 0.095. 
However, this time, a negative bet value was generated, indicating that the reform had a negative 
impact on the quality of services. As shown above, many more of the control variables are 
significant than the previous regression with the insignificant variables being city population, 
ownership and the dummy variable indicating that the hospital is located in Connecticut. Beta 
values indicated that larger hospitals offered a lower quality of medical services. However, the 
quality of services increased with time and was higher for teaching hospitals and those that 
offered emergency services. Generally, it was a trend in all of the quality regressions that the 
quality of medical services increased in all states with time. It was also a trend in half of the 
regressions that the reform had a positive effect on the quality of services with the exception of 
the previous regression in which it had a negative impact. In the following Discussion Section, 
we will discuss the implications of our results and make conclusions.
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Table 18 Full Difference-in-Differences Regression Results 
  
Cost Total Cost 
Adjusted 
Operation Room 
Adjusted 
Radiology Room 
Adjusted 
Respiratory Therapy 
Adjusted 
Physical Therapy 
Adjusted 
Electrocardiology 
Adjusted 
Emergency Room 
Adjusted 
MA*TIME -0.005 0.039 0.043 0.012 0.022 -0.012 0.046 
 [20.335] [0.592] [0.579] [0.148] [0.220] [0.181] [0.529] 
TIME 0.037 0.044 0.018 0.043 0.061 0.049 0.070 
 [12.979] [0.376] [0.373] [0.095] [0.141] [0.125] [0.338]* 
IF_MA 0.080 0.099 0.150 0.064 -0.054 0.093 0.287 
 [16.465]** [0.477]** [0.467]*** [0.119] [0.176] [0.148] [0.427]*** 
IF_CT 0.025 0.025 -0.046 0.078 -0.076 -0.022 0.377 
 [13.910] [0.401] [0.394] [0.101]** [0.154]* [0.127] [0.355]*** 
Hospital_>400 0.689 0.696 0.554 0.633 0.439 0.412 0.414 
 [21.821]*** [0.592]*** [0.571]*** [0.146]*** [0.226]*** [0.178]*** [0.531]*** 
Hospital_200-400 0.247 0.274 0.197 0.278 0.313 0.283 0.229 
 [17.075]*** [0.494]*** [0.477]*** [0.122]*** [0.183]*** [0.152]*** [0.444]*** 
Hospital_100-200 0.070 0.060 0.082 0.102 0.112 0.079 0.066 
 [12.766]*** [0.370]** [0.360]** [0.092]*** [0.139]** [0.116]* [0.335]* 
Ownership 
_Governmental 
0.079 0.014 0.036 0.086 0.028 0.081 0.070 
 [43.903]*** [1.273] [1.239] [0.329]*** [0.504] [0.385]** [1.170]** 
Ownership _Nonprofit 0.046 -0.008 0.047 0.039 0.055 -0.053 0.038 
 [19.925]** [0.605] [0.585] [0.156] [0.221] [0.190] [0.552] 
Teaching Hospital 0.069 0.121 0.063 0.031 0.010 0.047 0.086 
 [13.145]*** [0.366]*** [0.355]* [0.090] [0.135] [0.112] [0.327]** 
Town Population_50K 0.233       
 [1.742]***       
Emergency 
 
0.033 
[23.230] 
      
R^2 0.736 0.591 0.371 0.428 0.205 0.232 0.429 
Sample Size 736 722 711 705 640 612 701 
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*** significance p-value < 1% 
** significance p-value < 5% 
* significance p-value < 10% 
        
Quality Heart Attack Patients Given ACE 
Inhibitor or ARB for Left 
Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction 
(LVSD) 
Heart Failure Patients 
Given Smoking 
Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
Pneumonia Patients 
Given Smoking 
Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
Pneumonia Patients 
Given the Most 
Appropriate Initial 
Antibiotic(s) 
Surgery Patients Who 
Received Preventative 
Antibiotic(s) One Hour 
Before Incision 
Surgery Patients Whose 
Preventative Antibiotic(s) are 
Stopped Within 24 Hours After 
Surgery 
MA*TIME 0.040 0.136 0.304 -0.032 0.448 -0.263 
 [0.039] [0.037]* [0.046]*** [0.041] [0.026]*** [0.048]* 
TIME 0.217 0.341 0.341 0.292 0.195 0.490 
 [0.025]*** [0.023]*** [0.029]*** [0.028]*** [0.017]*** [0.032]*** 
IF_MA -0.090 -0.197 -0.361 -0.129 -0.536 0.341 
 [0.031] [0.031]*** [0.038]*** [0.032] [0.025]*** [0.046]** 
IF_CT -0.053 0.019 -0.132 -0.241 -0.158 -0.005 
 [0.027] [0.024] [0.034]** [0.030]*** [0.011]*** [0.020] 
Hospital_>400 0.016 0.184 0.236 -0.189 -0.066 -0.164 
 [0.056] [0.051]** [0.051]*** [0.044]* [0.017] [0.031]** 
Hospital_200-400 0.012 0.281 0.210 -0.008 0.014 -0.173 
 [0.034] [0.036]*** [0.037]*** [0.038] [0.013] [0.025]** 
Hospital_100-200 0.050 0.093 0.139 0.135 -0.061 -0.163 
 [0.023] [0.020]** [0.029]*** [0.031] [0.010] [0.020]** 
Ownership 
_Governmental 
-0.039 -0.058 -0.254 0.056 -0.020 -0.031 
 [0.075] [0.074] [0.083]*** [0.066] [0.031] [0.058] 
Ownership _Nonprofit -0.063 0.117 -0.008 0.110 -0.011 -0.075 
 [0.046] [0.035]** [0.046] [0.048] [0.019] [0.037] 
Teaching Hospital 0.220 -0.194 -0.177 0.144 0.067 0.225 
 [0.025]*** [0.023]*** [0.029]*** [0.028]* [0.010] [0.019]*** 
Population Size -0.032 0.035 0.001 0.332 -0.012 -0.018 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]*** [0.001] [0.002] 
Emergency Service 0.076 0.235 0.160 0.612 -0.038 0.129 
  [0.066]* [0.057]*** [0.068]** [0.049]*** 
 
[0.020] [0.039]*** 
R^2  0.105 0.326 0.438 0.450 0.139 0.221 
Sample 
Size 
 511 401 242 184 378 362 
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6.0 Discussion 
 
This section will provide the conclusions drawn from the results of our research, as well 
as discuss the limitations of our project and suggestions for further research. 
 
6.1 Our Results 
 
As the previous tables in the summary statistics section show, the operational cost is 
higher in MA and CT than in WI and the quality of medical service is the same in all the three 
states. In addition, the overall operational cost and the department salaries have increased and the 
quality of medical services has been improved since the reform. Also, the control variables have 
not changed much since the reform in both cost and quality models. 
It is evident from the results we obtained that there is a lot of variance between results 
and their significance. Although the R-Squared value varied highly between regressions, it is 
clear that the total cost model is somewhat more meaningful than the quality models, which 
generated values around 0.7 and 0.1-0.600, respectively. The R-Squared values of the emergency 
room and operating room salary regressions were around 0.5-0.6, which indicates that those 
models were also somewhat accurate. It is certainly an interesting finding, however, that more of 
the control variables appear to be significant in the quality models than the total cost model. It is 
also worth noting that for half of the quality regressions, the reform variable is significant, and 
has a positive impact on the quality of services. Although, it is significant in a fourth regression, 
by which a negative beta value was generated. Overall, we do have evidence to believe that the 
quality of medical services has been affected by the reform, but further research will be needed 
for our results to be conclusive. Total costs and salaries generally seemed to be higher in 
Massachusetts and the reform variable was insignificant. Although our research does not give 
any evidence to support that the reform did impact hospital costs, there is other literature and 
research that demonstrates otherwise. Therefore, it would also be useful to conduct further 
research before coming to a conclusion. The limitations of our research that prevent us from 
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making such concrete conclusions, as well as suggestions for further research will be discussed 
below. 
 
6.2 Limitation 
 
Just as with many research projects, there were a few limitations concerning ours that 
may have affected some of our results. The most important of these limitations are those 
surrounding the quality data, but there also some limitations surrounding other variables that 
could have been included in the model, such as patient mix and the Hospital Herfendahl Index 
(HHI). 
For the cost data, consistent and detailed data was conveniently provided through the 
CMS database. Detailed figures, such as  total operational costs, specific department salaries, 
cost of supplies were provided for each hospital, as required by the federal government.  
However, there are no such requirements for hospitals to report detailed information on the 
quality of medical services they provide. As a result, many of the hospitals did not report each 
year of the four year time span that we researched, forcing us to eliminate them from our 
regression analysis to stay consistent, which led to a very small sample size in many cases.  
Because our sample was so small, it is difficult to say whether or not the results of our regression 
could have been affected. Also, because the organization of this data through the Medicare 
Hospital Compare Quality of Care Database only began recently in 2005, many of their 
measurements for the four indicators changed from year to year. For example, in the earlier years 
of 2005 and 2006, one of the measurements for heart attack is whether or not the patient was 
given the proper treatment in ninety minutes or less, but this changed to sixty minutes or less in 
later years. Thus, we really narrowed down the data we used to specific measurements of 
indicators that has the largest number of reported percentages and consistent measurements, 
which was not many. Lastly, all of the quality data is reported in percentages of patients for 
which that particular measurements of one of the four indicators holds true. Therefore, it can be 
very misleading if 100% of patients is reported for a particular measurement when the sample is 
only 1 patient, which was the case for some indicators. Although these data were somewhat 
helpful in our exploration of the quality of medical services, it would be even more helpful to 
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have access to data on patients other than those affected by heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia 
or receiving surgery. Also, specific numbers, which hospitals are not required to report, such as 
patient mortality rate, would have been useful. 
Although, we tried to include as many control variables as we felt were appropriate for 
our models, there still are more that we would have preferred to include if we had access to such 
data, such as patient mix, which would evaluate the risks of patients being treated at a particular 
hospital, and additional ways to account for competition between hospitals, such as the HHI, 
both of which will be discussed in our suggestions for further research below. 
 
6.3 Technological Impacts 
 
Although our statistical and regression analysis results were not necessarily conclusive as 
to how the Massachusetts Health Care Reform impacted hospital costs and quality of medical 
services, it is clear that the reform has the ability to affect both of these factors according to our 
preliminary research and own research. Another factor that has the potential to help contain costs 
and improve quality is an improved electronic record keeping system (Liberto, 2009). For 
example, Stephen Lieber, who represents technology companies in the health industry through 
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, mentioned that if a more efficient 
record keeping were implemented, costs could be contained by avoiding repeats of tests or any 
unnecessary examinations (Liberto, 2009).  Additionally, if costs were contained, hospitals may 
be able to invest more in improving their quality of medical services. 
 
6.4 Further Research 
 
It is clear from our research, that the topic of how the Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
of 2006 affects hospital costs and the quality of medical services they provide has not reached a 
level of saturation, as there is still much more about it that can be explored.   
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Due to the time constraints of this research project for academic purposes, we chose only 
two states  (both of which had similar quality of medical services to Massachusetts) to research, 
which were Connecticut and Wisconsin. However, we do not doubt the value of studying even 
more states, such as all of those in New England or all fifty states of the nation. It would 
certainly be interesting to determine whether or not these changes were due to some geographic 
trend. A study of all of the states would certainly be more telling as to whether a trend did occur.  
There have been previous studies, such as that discussed in our literature review section by 
Lischko and Manzolillo, that use a national mean to compare to the cost and quality data of 
Massachusetts, but due to the high variability (economically and for quality of medical services), 
we think it would be much more meaningful to look at each state individually. 
There are also many other factors that may affect hospital cost and quality that 
individuals conducting future research on this topic could look into. For example, HHI, which is 
a measurement of competition between hospitals could most certainly have an effect on both cost 
and quality. Because this data is not just provided, researchers would have to obtain the specific 
location of each hospital and determine an area (such as a fifteen mile radius, for example) that 
they would assume to be effective in measuring the HHI, which could possibly require some 
research in itself. Patient mix, which is a measurement of risks of patients treated at a hospital, 
would also be something to look into. Again, data does not appear to be easily provided on this 
subject, so future researchers could explore on possible ways to calculate this with the data that 
is available. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A:  Additional Information about the Properties of the Reform 
 
Another key aspect of the reform movement is the “shared responsibility” of employers. 
These laws were created in the hopes that the government would be able to decrease the amount 
of funding spent on health care and that employers of businesses would be able to contribute to 
this cost. In the 2006 legislation, employers were held more accountable for the coverage of their 
employees and were at risk for penalty if they did not abide by the new laws. Although, most 
state residents were already covered through their employer, the new mandates stated that all 
employers of eleven or more full-time employees must offer an affordable and decent insurance 
plan (Fisher Wilson 2008). Employers were required to either have 25% of their employers 
covered by their plan or to contribute to 33% of the cost of their premium (Fisher Wilson 2008). 
The alternative is a charge of $295 per employee each year (Mass. Act Chp. 58, sec. 47, 2006). 
They can also be charged if their employees use more than $50,000 from a safety net fund during 
a number of visits, known as the “free rider surcharge” (Fisher Wilson 2008).  Although these 
new laws could end up putting quite a burden on owners of small businesses, a survey of 1,056 
employers of Massachusetts in 2007 revealed that 75% did feel responsible for offering their 
employees coverage and 70% supported the reform laws (Fisher Wilson 2008).     
The Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector is a government-run organization that is 
not only in charge of Commonwealth Care and Choice, but also provides information about 
health insurance options to those who need it, such as those who are not covered by their 
employer and not able to receive Medicaid (Waldman 2009). Essentially, the Connector provides 
residents with the help they need to ensure that they can purchase an affordable plan with the 
benefits they need (Waldman 2009) 
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Appendix B:  CMS Defined Name for CMS Hospital and Health Care Complexes 
 
hosp_xxxx_RPT.csv 
Column Name Column Type 
RPT_REC_NUM NUMBER NOT NULL 
PRVDR_CTRL_TYPE_CD CHAR(2) NULL 
PRVDR_NUM CHAR(6) NOT NULL 
NPI NUMBER NULL 
RPT_STUS_CD CHAR(1) NOT NULL 
FY_BGN_DT DATE NULL 
FY_END_DT DATE NULL 
PROC_DT DATE NULL 
INITL_RPT_SW CHAR(1) NULL 
LAST_RPT_SW CHAR(1) NULL 
TRNSMTL_NUM CHAR(2) NULL 
FI_NUM CHAR(2) NULL 
ADR_VNDR_CD CHAR(1) NULL 
FI_CREAT_DT DATE NULL 
UTIL_CD CHAR(1) NULL 
NPR_DT DATE NULL 
SPEC_IND CHAR(1) NULL 
FI_RCPT_DT DATE NULL 
 
Hosp_xxxx_ALPHA.csv 
Column Name Column Type 
RPT_REC_NUM NUMBER NOT NULL 
WKSHT_CD CHAR(7) NOT NULL 
LINE_NUM CHAR(5) NOT NULL 
ALPHNMRC_ITM_TXT CHAR(4) NOT NULL 
 
Hosp_xxxx_NMRC.csv 
Column Name Column Type 
RPT_REC_NUM NUMBER NOT NULL 
WKSHT_CD CHAR(7) NOT NULL 
LINE_NUM CHAR(5) NOT NULL 
ITM_VAL_NUM NUMBER NOT NULL 
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Appendix C:  SQL Query for the Hospital Cost Data 
In this example, we use the data of the Fiscal Year 2009 as the sample. 
Number of beds 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)="S300001") AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='01200') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
If the hospital is teaching hospital? 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_ALPHA.WKSHT_CD, Hosp_2009_ALPHA.LINE_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_ALPHA.CLMN_NUM, Hosp_2009_ALPHA.ALPHNMRC_ITM_TXT 
FROM Hosp_2009_ALPHA INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON Sheet1.[Hosptial 
Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON Hosp_2009_ALPHA.RPT_REC_NUM = 
Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_ALPHA.WKSHT_CD)='s200000') AND ((Hosp_2009_ALPHA.LINE_NUM)='02500') 
AND ((Hosp_2009_ALPHA.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
Total operation cost 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)="G200000") AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='04000') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0200')); 
Operation room salary 
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SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)='A000000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='03700') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
Radiology room salary 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)='A000000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='04200') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
Respiratory Therapy Salary 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)='A000000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='04900') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
Physical therapy Salary 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
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WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)='A000000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='05000') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
Electrocardiology Salary 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)='A000000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='05300') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
Emergency room salary 
SELECT Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID], Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM, Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM, 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.ITM_VAL_NUM 
FROM Hosp_2009_NMRC_new INNER JOIN (Sheet1 INNER JOIN Hosp_2009_RPT_new ON 
Sheet1.[Hosptial Provider ID] = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.PRVDR_NUM) ON 
Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.RPT_REC_NUM = Hosp_2009_RPT_new.RPT_REC_NUM 
WHERE (((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.WKSHT_CD)='A000000') AND 
((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.LINE_NUM)='06100') AND ((Hosp_2009_NMRC_new.CLMN_NUM)='0100')); 
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Appendix D: Hospital List 
 
Provider Number Hospital Name City State Hospital Type Hospital Owner Emergency Service 
070001 HOSPITAL OF ST RAPHAEL NEW HAVEN CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070002 ST FRANCIS HOSPITAL & MEDICAL CENTER HARTFORD CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
070003 DAY KIMBALL HOSPITAL PUTNAM CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070004 SHARON HOSPITAL SHARON CT Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary Yes 
070005 WATERBURY HOSPITAL WATERBURY CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070006 STAMFORD HOSPITAL STAMFORD CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070007 LAWRENCE & MEMORIAL HOSPITAL NEW LONDON CT Acute Care Hospitals Government - Hospital District or Authority Yes 
070008 JOHNSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL STAFFORD SPRINGS CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070010 BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL BRIDGEPORT CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070011 CHARLOTTE HUNGERFORD HOSPITAL TORRINGTON CT Acute Care Hospitals Government - Federal Yes 
070012 ROCKVILLE GENERAL HOSPITAL ROCKVILLE CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070015 NEW MILFORD HOSPITAL NEW MILFORD CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070016 ST MARYS HOSPITAL WATERBURY CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
070017 MIDSTATE MEDICAL CENTER MERIDEN CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070018 GREENWICH HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION GREENWICH CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070019 MILFORD HOSPITAL, INC MILFORD CT Acute Care Hospitals Government - Federal Yes 
070020 MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL MIDDLETOWN CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070021 WINDHAM COMM MEM HOSP & HATCH HOSP WILLIMANTIC CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070022 YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL NEW HAVEN CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070024 WILLIAM W BACKUS HOSPITAL NORWICH CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070025 HARTFORD HOSPITAL HARTFORD CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070027 MANCHESTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MANCHESTER CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070028 ST VINCENT'S MEDICAL CENTER BRIDGEPORT CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
070029 BRISTOL HOSPITAL BRISTOL CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070031 GRIFFIN HOSPITAL DERBY CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070033 DANBURY HOSPITAL DANBURY CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
070034 NORWALK HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION NORWALK CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070035 HOSPITAL OF CENTRAL CONNECTICUT, THE NEW BRITAIN CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
070036 JOHN DEMPSEY HOSPITAL FARMINGTON CT Acute Care Hospitals Government - Local Yes 
070039 MASONIC HOME AND HOSPITAL WALLINGFORD CT Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other No 
220001 HEALTHALLIANCE HOSPITALS, INC FITCHBURG MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220002 MOUNT AUBURN HOSPITAL CAMBRIDGE MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220008 STURDY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ATTLEBORO MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220010 LAWRENCE GENERAL HOSPITAL LAWRENCE MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220011 CAMBRIDGE HEALTH ALLIANCE CAMBRIDGE MA Acute Care Hospitals Government - Local Yes 
220012 CAPE COD HOSPITAL HYANNIS MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220015 COOLEY DICKINSON HOSPITAL INC,THE NORTHAMPTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220016 BAYSTATE FRANKLIN MEDICAL CENTER GREENFIELD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220017 CARITAS CARNEY HOSPITAL INC BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
220019 HARRINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL SOUTHBRIDGE MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
82 
 
220020 ST ANNE'S HOSPITAL CORPORATION FALL RIVER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
220024 HOLYOKE MEDICAL CENTER HOLYOKE MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220029 ANNA JAQUES HOSPITAL NEWBURYPORT MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220030 WING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER PALMER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220031 BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER CORPORATION BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220033 BEVERLY HOSPITAL CORPORATION BEVERLY MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220035 NORTH SHORE MEDICAL CENTER SALEM MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220036 CARITAS ST ELIZABETH'S MEDICAL CENTER BRIGHTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
220046 BERKSHIRE MEDICAL CENTER INC PITTSFIELD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220049 MARLBOROUGH HOSPITAL MARLBOROUGH MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220050 BAYSTATE MARY LANE HOSPITAL WARE MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220051 NORTH ADAMS REGIONAL HOSPITAL NORTH ADAMS MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220052 BROCKTON HOSPITAL BROCKTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220058 CLINTON HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION CLINTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220060 JORDAN HOSPITAL INC PLYMOUTH MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220062 ADCARE HOSPITAL OF WORCESTER INC WORCESTER MA Acute Care Hospitals Government - State No 
220063 LOWELL GENERAL HOSPITAL LOWELL MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220065 NOBLE HOSPITAL WESTFIELD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220066 MERCY MEDICAL CENTER SPRINGFIELD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220067 QUINCY MEDICAL CENTER QUINCY MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220070 HALLMARK HEALTH SYSTEM MELROSE MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220071 MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220073 MORTON HOSPITAL & MEDICAL CENTER TAUNTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220074 SOUTHCOAST HOSPITAL GROUP, INC FALL RIVER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220075 MASSACHUSETTS EYE AND EAR INFIRMARY BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220077 BAYSTATE MEDICAL CENTER SPRINGFIELD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220080 CARITAS HOLY FAMILY HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER METHUEN MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
220082 SAINTS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER INC LOWELL MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
220083 BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS HOSPITAL - NEEDHAM NEEDHAM MA Acute Care Hospitals Government - Local Yes 
220084 EMERSON HOSPITAL W CONCORD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220086 BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS MEDICAL CENTER BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220088 NEW ENGLAND BAPTIST HOSPITAL BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private No 
220090 MILFORD REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER MILFORD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220095 HEYWOOD HOSPITAL GARDNER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220098 NASHOBA VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AYER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220100 SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220101 NEWTON-WELLESLEY HOSPITAL NEWTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220105 WINCHESTER HOSPITAL WINCHESTER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220108 MILTON HOSPITAL INC MILTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220110 BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPTIAL BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220111 CARITAS GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER BROCKTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220116 TUFTS-NEW ENGLAND MEDICAL CENTER BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220119 FAULKNER HOSPITAL BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220126 CARITAS NORWOOD HOSPITAL, INC NORWOOD MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
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220135 FALMOUTH HOSPITAL FALMOUTH MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220162 DANA-FARBER CANCER INSTITUTE BOSTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private No 
220163 UMASS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER INC WORCESTER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220171 LAHEY CLINIC HOSPITAL BURLINGTON MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
220174 MERRIMACK VALLEY HOSPITAL HAVERHILL MA Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary Yes 
220175 METROWEST MEDICAL CENTER FRAMINGHAM MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
220176 ST VINCENT HOSPITAL WORCESTER MA Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520002 ST MICHAELS HSPTL STEVENS POINT WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520004 FRANCISCAN SKEMP LA CROSSE HSPTL LA CROSSE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520008 WAUKESHA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL WAUKESHA WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520009 ST ELIZABETH HSPTL APPLETON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520011 LAKEVIEW MED CTR RICE LAKE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520013 SACRED HEART HSPTL EAU CLAIRE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520017 ST JOSEPHS HSPTL CHIPPEWA FALLS WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520019 ST MARYS HOSPITAL RHINELANDER WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520021 UNITED HSPTL SYS KENOSHA WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520027 COLUMBIA ST MARYS OZAUKEE CAMPUS MEQUON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520028 MONROE CLINIC MONROE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520030 ASPIRUS WAUSAU HOSPITAL WAUSAU WI Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary Yes 
520033 RIVERVIEW HSPTL ASSOC WISCONSIN RAPIDS WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520034 AURORA MED CTR MANITOWOC CTY TWO RIVERS WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520035 AURORA SHEBOYGAN MEM MED CTR SHEBOYGAN WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520037 ST JOSEPHS HSPTL MARSHFIELD WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520038 AURORA MED CENTER-WASHINGTON COUNTY HARTFORD WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520041 DIVINE SAVIOR HLTHCARE PORTAGE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520044 ST NICHOLAS HOSPITAL SHEBOYGAN WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520045 THEDA CLARK MED CTR NEENAH WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520048 MERCY MED CTR OF OSHKOSH OSHKOSH WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520049 BELLIN MEMORIAL HSPTL GREEN BAY WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520051 COLUMBIA ST MARYS HSPTL  MILW (COL & MILW CAMPUS) MILWAUKEE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520057 ST CLARE HSPTL HLTH SVCS BARABOO WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520059 AURORA MEMORIAL HSPTL BURLINGTON BURLINGTON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520062 OCONOMOWOC MEM HSPTL OCONOMOWOC WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520063 ST JOSEPHS COM HSPTL WEST BEND WEST BEND WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520066 MERCY HLTH SYS CORP JANESVILLE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520070 LUTHER HOSPITAL MAYO HEALTH SYSTEM EAU CLAIRE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
520071 FORT HEALTHCARE FORT ATKINSON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520075 ST VINCENT HSPTL GREEN BAY WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520076 BEAVER DAM COM HSPTL BEAVER DAM WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520078 WHEATON FRANCISCAN HEALTHCARE- ST FRANCIS MILWAUKEE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520083 ST MARY'S HOSPITAL MADISON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
520087 GUNDERSEN LUTH MED CTR LA CROSSE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520088 ST AGNES HSPTL FOND DU LAC WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520089 MERITER HSPTL MADISON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
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520091 HOWARD YOUNG MED CTR WOODRUFF WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520095 SAUK PRAIRIE MEM HSPTL PRAIRIE DU SAC WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520096 WHEATON FRANCISCAN HEALTHCARE- ALL SAINTS RACINE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520097 ST MARYS HSPTL MED CTR GREEN BAY WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
520098 UW HEALTH  UW HOSPITALS AND CLINICS MADISON WI Acute Care Hospitals Government - Hospital District or Authority Yes 
520100 BELOIT MEM HSPTL BELOIT WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520102 AURORA LAKELAND MED CTR ELKHORN WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520103 COMMUNITY MEM HSPTL MENOMONEE FALLS WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520107 HOLY FAMILY MEMORIAL MANITOWOC WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
520109 HESS MEM HSPTL MAUSTON WI Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary Yes 
520113 BAY AREA MED CTR MARINETTE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520116 WATERTOWN MEM HSPTL WATERTOWN WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520136 WHEATON FRANCISCAN HEALTHCARE- ST JOSEPH MILWAUKEE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520138 AURORA ST LUKES MED CTR MILWAUKEE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520139 WEST ALLIS MEM HSPTL WEST ALLIS WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520160 APPLETON MED CTR APPLETON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Other Yes 
520170 WHEATON FRANCISCAN HEALTHCARE- ELMBROOK MEMORIAL BROOKFIELD WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Church Yes 
520177 FROEDTERT MEM LUTHERAN HSPTL MILWAUKEE WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520189 AURORA MED CTR KENOSHA KENOSHA WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520193 AURORA BAYCARE MED CTR GREEN BAY WI Acute Care Hospitals Government - State Yes 
520194 ORTHOPAEDIC HSPTL OF WI GLENDALE WI Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary No 
520195 COLUMBIA CENTER MEQUON WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private No 
520196 OAK LEAF SURGCL HSPTL EAU CLAIRE WI Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary No 
520198 AURORA MED CTR OSHKOSH OSHKOSH WI Acute Care Hospitals Voluntary non-profit - Private Yes 
520199 WISCONSIN HEART HSPTL WAUWATOSA WI Acute Care Hospitals Proprietary Yes 
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Appendix E: Regression Tables 
 
Table E1: Cost Model (Total Cost) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
Table E2: Results of Variables in Cost (Total Cost) Model  
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Table E3: Cost Model (Operating Room Salary) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
Table E4: Results of Variables in Cost (Operating Room Salary) Model 
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Table E5: Cost Model (Radiology Room Salary) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
Table E6: Results of Variables in Cost (Radiology Room Salary) Model 
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Table E7: Cost Model (Respiratory Room Salary) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
Table E8: Results of Variables in Cost (Respiratory Room Salary) Model 
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Table E9: Cost Model (Physical Therapy Department Salary) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E10: Results of Variables in Cost (Physical Therapy Department Salary) Model 
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Table E11: Cost Model (Electrocardiology Room Salary) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E12: Results of Variables in Cost (Electrocardiology Room Salary) Model 
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Table E13: Cost Model (Emergency Room Salary) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
Table E14: Results of Variables in Cost (Emergency Room Salary) Model 
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Table E15: Quality Model (Heart Attack) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
Table E16: Results of Variables in Quality (Heart Attack) Model 
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Table E17: Quality Model (Heart Failure) R^2 Value  
 
 
 
 
Table E18: Results of Variables in Quality (Heart Failure) Model 
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Table E19: Quality Model (Pneumonia-Receiving Smoking Cessation Advice) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
Table E20: Results of Variables in Quality (Pneumonia-Receiving Smoking Cessation Advice) 
Model 
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Table E21: Quality Model (Pneumonia-Receiving the Most Appropriate Antibiotic) R^2 Value 
 
 
 
Table E22: Results of Variables in Quality (Pneumonia-Receiving the Most Appropriate 
Antibiotic) Model 
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Table E23: Quality Model (Surgery-Patients Receiving Antibiotic within 1 Hour After Incision) 
R^2 Value 
 
 
 
Table E24: Results of Variables in Quality (Surgery--Patients Receiving Antibiotic within 1 
Hour After Incision) Model 
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Table E25: Quality Model (Surgery-Patients Stopping Antibiotic within 24 Hour After Surgery) 
R^2 Value 
 
 
 
 
Table E26: Results of Variables in Quality (Surgery-Patients Stopping Antibiotic within 24 Hour 
After Surgery) Model 
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Appendix F: Indicators Abbreviation 
 
TIME: If the data is collected after the reform? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
IF_MA: If the hospital is in MA? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
IF_CT: If the hospital is in CT? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
IF_WI: If the hospital is in WI? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
HOSP_EXTRA_LARGE: If the hospital is extra large? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
HOSP_LARGE: If the hospital is large? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
HOSP_MEDIUM: If the hospital is medium? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
HOSP_SMALL: If the hospital is medium? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
OWN_GOV: if the hospital is governmental hospital? 1 – Yes 0 – No 
 
OWN_NONPROF: If the hospital is nonprofit hospital? 1 – Yes 0 – No 
 
OWN_PROP: If the hospital is proprietary hospital? 1 – Yes 0 – No  
 
EMER: If the hospital provides emergency service? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
TEACH: If the hospital is teaching hospital? 1 – Yes 0 - No 
 
Pop_50T: Town population in fifty thousand where the hospital is located 
 
TOTAL_COST: total operation cost in dollars 
TOTAL_COST_MIL: total operation cost in million dollars 
OP_ROOM: operation room salary in dollar 
OP_ROOM_MIL: operation room salary in million dollars 
RADIO_ROOM: radiology room salary in dollar 
RADIO_ROOM_MIL: radiology room salary in million dollar 
RES_THE: Respiratory Therapy Salary in dollar 
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RES_THE_MIL: Respiratory Therapy Salary in million dollar 
PHY_THE: Physical therapy Salary in dollar 
PHY_THE_MIL: Physical therapy Salary in million dollars 
ELEC: electrocardiology Salary in dollar 
ELEC_MIL: electrocardiology Salary in million dollars 
EMER_SAL: emergency room salary in dollar 
EMER_SAL_MIL: emergency room salary in million dollars 
 
HA: Heart Attack Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular Systolic 
Dysfunction (LVSD) 
HF: Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice/Counseling 
P_ADV: Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice/Counseling 
P_ANTI: Pneumonia Patients Given the Most Appropriate Initial Antibiotic(s)   
S1: Surgery Patients Who Received Preventative Antibiotic(s) One Hour Before Incision 
S24: Surgery Patients Whose Preventative Antibiotic(s) are Stopped Within 24 hours After 
Surgery 
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Appendix G: Graphs of Trends of Dependent Variables in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and Wisconsin 
 
Figure G1: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Total Operating Cost (Million Dollars) from Fiscal Year 
2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G2: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Operating Room Salaries (Million Dollars) from Fiscal 
Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G3: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Radiology Room Salaries (Million Dollars) from Fiscal 
Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G4: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Respiratory Room Salaries (Million Dollars) from Fiscal 
Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G5: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Physical Therapy Salaries (Million Dollars) from Fiscal 
Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G6: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Electrocardiology Room Salaries (Million Dollars) from 
Fiscal Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G7: Inflation Adjusted Hospital Emergency Room Salaries (Million Dollars) from Fiscal 
Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G8: Heart Attack Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular Systolic 
Dysfunction (LVSD) (100%) from Fiscal Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and 
Wisconsin 
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Figure G9: Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice / Counseling (100%) from 
Fiscal Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G10: Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking Cessation Advice / Counseling (100%) from Fiscal 
Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G11: Pneumonia Patients Given the Most Appropriate Initial Antibiotic(s) (100%) from 
Fiscal Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G12: Surgery Patients Who Received Preventative Antibiotic(s) One Hour Before Incision 
(100%) from Fiscal Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
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Figure G13: Surgery Patients Whose Preventative Antibiotic(s) are Stopped Within 24 Hours After 
Surgery (100%) from Fiscal Year 2005 to 2009 in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Wisconsin 
 
